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ABSTRACT 
 
New technologies and increased competition require CEOs to assess and analyze vast 
amounts of information. They need cognitive ability and higher education and training. 
Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure to act quickly, to recognize potential problems 
or opportunities, and to take action immediately. They must be willing to take risks (Joos, 
Leone, & Zimmerman, 2003). Companies are turning to younger CEOs (Loomis, 2007) 
as they are more familiar with new technologies, better able to endure high stress 
environments, more open to new ideas, and less reluctant to take risks.  
 This study examined the relationship between the financial performance of a 
company and specific demographic factors of its CEO, including age, tenure, education, 
and prior experience, and whether the CEO was hired from within or outside the 
company. Also, the study examined the relationship between CEO’s age and tenure 
before and after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (1999). The goal was to establish a 
prediction model, based on demographics of successful financial industry CEOs, to aid 
companies in their selection of new CEOs. The data were collected from U.S. companies 
in the insurance, securities, diversified financial, commercial banks, and IT industries 
which file financial statements with a government agency.  
The findings indicate a significant difference in: 
• a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act (1999)  
• the age of new CEOs of insurance companies and that of their counterparts at 
other types of financial institutions or IT companies. 
There was no significant difference in the level of education or tenure. 
  
x 
There was a significant correlation between: 
• the changes in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and 
prior experience  
• changes in revenue, in stock price, and in return on equity and the variables of 
firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure  
• changes in stock price and a new CEO who graduated from school tier three or 
four (below average undergraduate schools).  
There was no significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree, and 
prior experiences, and a company’s change in revenue or in its stock price. 
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Chapter 1 – Overview 
 
 As an owner/manager of an insurance brokerage firm, this researcher is always 
curious to learn what happens to companies when CEOs are replaced. Among other 
things, do companies experience rapid growth or is there a significant decrease in market 
value? The selection or replacement of CEOs not only affects a company’s performance 
(Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) but also the national economy (Luhby, 2008) as evidenced by 
the recent economic turmoil. Among the many factors that companies must take into 
consideration when selecting a CEO is leadership ability and how this can be defined and 
verified.  
 The researcher is a huge believer in management scholar Hogan and Kaiser’s 
“personality predicts leadership” (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Hogan and Kaiser believe that 
personality is vital to a leader’s success because effective leadership “involves 
persuading other people to set aside, for a period of time, their individual concerns and to 
pursue a common goal that is important for the responsibilities and welfare of a group” 
(Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994, p. 493). Moreover, Hogan, et al. maintain that a leader’s 
personality will dictate his/her leadership style, and therefore eventually impact, if not 
determine, organizational performance. 
 Like Hogan, et al., (1994) Northouse believes that leadership is a process whereby 
an individual influences a group of individuals in order to achieve a common goal 
(Northouse, 2001). However, he maintains that leadership is a process rather than a trait 
or characteristic. It is not linear, but interactive. In other words, leadership is connected 
with building cohesive and goal-oriented teams. Therefore, leadership is closely tied to, 
and its true merit dependent upon, team performance.  
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 It is significant to note the difference between these two definitions of leadership 
and how they can be applied to the business world. Northouse (2001) defines leadership 
in a more general context in which interaction is possible and expected, for example, in 
small companies. Hogan and Kaiser (2005), on the other hand, define leadership in a 
more limited context, one that is linear and involves much less interaction. This is the 
environment in which a CEO must function, one in which their personality or 
management style directly impacts employee and company performance. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be more on Hogan and Kaiser’s theories and 
how they apply to the often autonomous role of CEOs in large companies. 
 When companies hire new CEOs, they must not only consider personality and 
leadership qualities, but also other factors such as one’s age. Warren Buffett believes that 
age is one of the most important factors a company must consider when choosing  
a CEO’s successor (Loomis, 2007). There is a current trend among companies to hire 
CEOs who are younger. I believe that this trend is largely due to heightened competition, 
the emphasis and importance of information-based technologies and rapid globalization. 
In brief, younger CEOs are more likely to better understand the workings of today’s 
technology and the concept of what is new today is old tomorrow than CEOs in the past. 
Also, they tend to be more creative and to foster creativity in others, which allows them 
to more easily adopt a risk-taking attitude.  
 I also believe that CEOs now require a higher level of education, with a greater 
emphasis on math, economics, and data analysis. Like the trend towards youth, the 
importance of higher education is partly due to the onslaught of information brought on 
by advances in technology. In addition, because of globalization and heightened 
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competition, CEOs are required to have more professional training in making quick 
decisions based on objective analysis. A company’s survival can easily depend on a CEO 
having this ability. According to Keiser, CEO positions are now considered to be 
“professionalizations,” which are defined as jobs or professions that entail intellectual 
ability and extensive training (Keiser, 2004). 
 Prior experience is another important factor in the selection of a CEO. 
Throughout their careers, have the candidates demonstrated an ability to solve problems 
and/or satisfy the market? Have they enhanced or tarnished the image of a company? Do 
they have expertise in a specific area, or skills and knowledge that can be applied to a 
wide range of business environments? 
 This dissertation reviews leadership based trait theory to further study the CEO’s 
trait and the CEO’s announcement effect to ensure that a company evaluating CEO 
candidates will choose the one who is most qualified and capable. 
 It also evaluates the job performance and effectiveness of CEOs by examining 
changes in revenue, stock prices and returns on equity at certain intervals during his/her 
tenure. These changes could serve as proxies to determine whether or not a company has 
hired the right CEO – the one most able, competent, qualified, and worthy of the job. 
The Problem 
 
 When a company replaces its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the stock market’s 
demand must be fitted with the company’s supply, which in this case is the selection of a 
new CEO. That is, the new CEO’s ability (a combination of personality, age, educational 
background, and prior experience) as a leader must meet the market’s expectations. Thus, 
upon the announcement of a new CEO, subsequent changes in stock price movement 
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(stock price volatility) are inevitable. For example, when Boeing (Colias, 2005) named 
W. James McNerney Jr. as CEO in June 2005, its share price increased $4.29. In contrast, 
when Nokia (Huuhtanen, 2005) appointed Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo as its new CEO in 
August 2005, its U.S. shares slipped $0.10.  
 The seesaw-like movement in stock prices demonstrates that the financial market 
does indeed evaluate the incoming CEO’s ability and reputation. Here, ability (Morris & 
Maisto, 2005) means a skill that a CEO actually has and for which the CEO needs no 
additional training. Furthermore, reputation (Karuna, 2006) is defined as the market’s 
perception of the CEO’s ability to ensure the long-term success and survival of his/her 
firm.  
 The market will endeavor to predict the firm’s future direction by analyzing the 
incoming CEO’s ability from his prior experiences and his personality, along with other 
demographic factors including age and educational background. Moreover, the stock 
market’s initial reaction to a newly-announced CEO may be interpreted as a reflection of 
the social-self, or how leaders are perceived by others (Judge, Colbert, & Illies, 2004). 
That social-self is reflected by the leader’s emergence and his leadership effectiveness 
(Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002).Therefore, the new CEO’s perceived ability 
affects the future direction of the firm: its value, its management and its stakeholders. 
 If a CEO’s intellectual ability (intelligence) is related to his personality 
(especially competency) and it is assumed that personality predicts leadership (Hogan, et 
al., 2004), then the CEO’s general intellectual ability partly depends on innate cognitive 
ability, age and level of education. Moreover, due to rapid globalization, intense 
competition and internal and external environmental changes (Choo, 2001) such as 
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regulations, politics, economy, technology, socio-culture, and ecology, CEOs are now 
expected not only to keep up with but also to adapt to these fast-paced environments by 
gaining a broader understanding of the domestic and world markets and by being able to 
make the right decisions within a short amount of time. As a result, when a company 
selects a new CEO there is a tendency to place more importance upon his/her personality, 
age, education level, and prior experience.  
 The insurance industry is a great example to further study the aforementioned 
factors because this previously ossified industry was government regulated until 1999.  
Since then, the industry has gone through a tremendous transformation, primarily due to 
globalization, deregulation (Yeager, Yeager, & Harshman, 2007) and terrorist attacks. 
Meanwhile, the IT (information technology), biotech, and high-tech industries remain 
domestically and globally competitive.   
       In a regulated industry (Hadlock, Lee, & Parrino, 2002), it is much easier to select 
a new CEO because the entry barriers, including bureaucracy, either prevent or 
discourage other companies, foreign or domestic, from entering the market. This is one 
reason why less complex, regulated firms (Joos, et al., 2003) tend to hire younger CEOs. 
In contrast, as a result of the transition from a regulated to non-regulated industry, 
insurance companies are now hiring slightly older CEOs than before, placing more 
emphasis on their experience, professional knowledge and history of financial 
performance as evidence of their ability to manage more complex, macro environments 
(Joos, et al., 2003).  
 In addition, there are specific industry characteristics which impact the selection 
of CEOs. Both macro and micro factors must be considered when selecting CEO 
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candidates from either the inside or the outside. Macro factors are generally non-firm 
specific, while micro factors are firm-specific (Joos, et al., 2003). More micro factors are 
considered under limited competition for regulated companies, such as utility industries, 
whereas more macro factors are considered under unlimited competition. In turn, in the 
insurance industry after deregulation, more macro factors are considered. The increased 
competition within the same industry makes the choice of CEO more of a risk, as more 
competition makes decision making more difficult and more vital to a company’s 
survival. 
 Due to President Clinton’s deregulation of the insurance industry in 1999 
(Yeager, et al., 2007), CEOs in the industry have awakened from a long slumber. 
Previously, they were protected under laws such as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These laws had prohibited banks, insurance 
companies and security firms from entering each other’s businesses. However, since 
deregulation, i.e., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Neale & Peterson, 2005), these 
industries have become more competitive among themselves. Moreover, security firms 
have now entered the banking industry, and visa versa. For example, in 1998 Citigroup 
acquired the security firm, Solomon Smith Barney, whereas Citibank acquired Travelers 
Insurance the same year. Citibank (Citigroup, 2002) also acquired California Federal 
Bank and made it into an insurance brokerage.  
 As a result, insurance companies are now placing more emphasis on age, 
personality, education and intellectual ability in their selection of CEOs in order to 
compete with other financial firms (Joos, et al., 2003). This is brought about by an effort 
to ensure that CEOs remain competitive with their more experienced and highly trained 
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counterparts at banks, such as the Bank of America and Citibank, and at investment 
companies, such as Prudential and Merrill Lynch. 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between a firm’s 
performance and the new incoming CEO’s personality and leadership style, as well as 
his/her age, education level, and prior experiences. From this, we should be able to 
determine what role these factors play in the success or failure of a company’s financial 
performance. The ultimate goal is to arrive at a formula which will enable companies to 
select the candidates who are most suitable for the given business sector and who are the 
most likely to succeed. 
The publicly held business corporation (Horngren, 1981) is an extremely delicate 
structure, partly because ownership is shared by stockholders who often delegate 
management responsibilities to professionals. This delegation relationship is called an 
agency contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in which stockholders engage another person 
(agent) to perform some service on their behalf. This act involves delegating some 
decision-making authority. To maximize shareholders’ interests, agency costs (the sum of 
the costs of formal and informal structuring contracts) should be minimized. The best 
agency framework (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is to resolve the conflicts of interest 
between stockholders, managers, and bondholders of the firm. Due to this complicated 
structure, CEOs, as professional managers or owners (Carey & Ogden, 2000), must 
survive not only by fulfilling their contracts with the board committees, but also by 
satisfying or surpassing market expectations.  
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Before examining these relationships any further, it is essential to define the role 
of a CEO and to fully understand his or her responsibilities. The Chief Executive Officer 
(Downes & Goodman, 1991) is the person primarily responsible for carrying out the 
strategic plans and policies of the organization. In addition, a CEO usually assumes the 
title of Chairman of the Board or President of a company. In this capacity, a CEO advises 
and informs board members, interfaces between the board and staff, and is expected to 
fully cooperate with the board in his/her own performance review. He/she not only 
attempts to persuade and control board members, but also acts as a peacemaker by 
minimizing conflict. Finally, a CEO must compete with rival companies, most often with 
limited resources (including human, material, and financial) and under time, information, 
and legal constraints.  
Similar to the president of a nation, the CEO’s many responsibilities include 
recommending a yearly budget for the board’s approval; managing the organization’s 
resources within budget guidelines and according to current laws and regulations; 
shaping the firm’s climate; opening/closing a plant; entering a new market; marketing, 
selling, and developing new products; laying off employees; hiring high-ranking staff; 
and increasing the company’s share value (Vancil, 1987). The CEO must also attempt to 
increase the value of the firm in order to satisfy the stakeholders. Throughout his/her 
reign, the organization’s mission, programs, products, and services should present a 
consistently strong, positive image to relevant stakeholders.  
A CEO’s critical mistakes due to negligence or faulty actions from misjudgment 
often lead to either financial and/or non-financial disaster, not only for the company but 
also for society as a whole, as witnessed in the Enron case (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Of all 
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these responsibilities, often the most important is the hiring and positioning of high-
ranking officers because “leadership is about the performance of teams, groups, and 
organizations” (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005, p. 169).  
In an environment of such major rapid change, the CEO’s role (Hill & 
Westlaufer, 1998) must also undergo a corresponding transformation, otherwise, his/her 
position of authority may quickly evaporate. On the other hand, a CEO must strike a 
delicate balance, since rapid change is not always perceived as desirable. For example, 
during Franco Bernabe’s six-year tenure as CEO of ENI, Italy’s large, energy-focused 
industrial conglomerate, Bernabe quickly transformed the organization from a debt-
ridden, government-owned, and politically controlled entity into a competitive and 
profitable publicly traded corporation focused on energy production (Hill & Westlaufer, 
1998).  
 To accomplish this, Bernabe sold off 200 companies, dismissed hundreds of 
managers, and installed radical new business systems and procedures. When his tireless 
advocacy for change prompted the Board of Directors to demote him and call for his 
ouster, he responded, “A leader cannot take the weighted average of other people’s 
opinions and make them his own. A person who has to make important decisions has to 
make them alone. You need an inner compass to indicate the way” (Hill & Westlaufer, 
1998, p. 86).  
The following illustrates how a CEO must approach problems from a variety of 
angles and take the appropriate actions by using a variety of decision making processes. 
In economics and finance, decision making and judgment are based on rational choice 
theory (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cook, 1998), which states that if the CEO fails to be 
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rational, then he/she will not be able to survive competitive market forces. The CEO 
needs to learn quickly as a decision maker, because if he makes a mistake he will be 
eliminated from the game. 
Some scholars, such as Gigerenzer, Kahneman, and Hammond (Mellers, et al., 
1998) criticize the assumptions behind the rational choice theory. Gigerenzer argues that 
good judgment is not only based entirely on rational choice, but also derives from content 
analysis, including any underlying laws, principles, and axioms. In addition, good 
judgment should reflect basic principles of survival and adaptation. Likewise, Kahneman 
(Mellers, et al., 1998) suggests that logical analyses should be supplemented with 
substantive evaluations which assess the quality of decision outcomes. Lastly, Hammond 
argues that the integration of both internal consistency of decisions and empirical 
accuracy of decisions is rationality. As seen in the arguments against the rational choice 
theory, the CEO must be a good decision maker based upon his/her intelligence and prior 
experiences.   
Successful CEOs have many different decision making processes to choose from 
and can judge when to change or abandon them entirely (Carey & Ogden, 2000). Such 
flexibility encourages and often results in great ideas and inventions. In most cases, the 
quality of a CEO’s education, the areas of expertise and experience in making decisions 
enable the CEO to identify and solve problems. 
In the real business world, the public lives in ambiguity and a lack of knowledge 
about relevant probabilities. According to Fox and Tversky (Mellers, et al., 1998), 
feelings of competence are dependent upon clear versus ambiguous knowledge. Numbers 
alone cannot help CEOs solve problems. Sometimes algorithms work, whereas other 
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times heuristics apply. As formal education involves learning both heuristics and 
algorithms, it therefore follows that higher education gives CEOs the ability to base 
decisions on a variety of factors and to approach problems from different angles.  
In any case, many factors can either help or impede problem solving. One of these 
factors is the CEO’s level of motivation or emotional arousal, which is influenced by any 
number of factors including age, wealth, and tenure. It is generally understood that 
younger CEOs have a greater level of motivation and ambition, whereas age may inhibit 
older CEOs who are interested in maintaining the status quo (Mellers, et al., 1998). On 
the other hand, age, or experience, is often invaluable when faced with problems that 
share some semblance to past experience. This paper will look at age as a factor in the 
selection of CEOs and see whether this trend towards younger CEOs, with an emphasis 
on innovation, education, etc. is a good one or not. 
 The new CEO’s personality, age, education and prior experiences are all factors 
that significantly impact not only the future direction of the firm, but also the CEO’s job 
performance and leadership effectiveness (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).  
 Leadership, as Hogan and Kaiser (2005) define it, is the ability to build and 
maintain a group that performs well compared to its competition. Moreover, leadership 
should be evaluated in terms of the performance of the group over time. The performance 
of the company can be checked by studying (Copeland & Weston, 1992) the change of 
shares in large stockholders as a signal of a change in the firm’s value. In brief, the 
selling of company stock often signals less confidence in the company’s future, whereas 
the purchase of company stock is perceived as a good sign and will encourage investors. 
By studying the relationship between the company’s performance (effectiveness) and the 
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past and present demographic factors of CEOs, such as age, education, prior experience, 
tenure, and insider/outsider, a model can be developed to help companies choose the right 
CEO. 
 The model will always be contaminated by unexpected external macro factors that 
cannot be controlled. These include the implementation of new government regulations, 
the penetration of the market by foreign companies, sudden changes in the price of oil, 
and innovations in technology. Well-developed application methods already exist that 
can predict leadership potential among middle management. However, these were not 
intended, nor have they been adapted or amended, to predict the leadership capacity of 
potential CEOs. As an example, Hogan and Kaiser’s Domain Model of Competencies 
(Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) identifies four broad domains of managerial competencies: 
• The intrapersonal domain, internalized standards of performance; 
• The interpersonal domain, social skills, role taking and role playing abilities; 
• The business domain, abilities and technical knowledge related to organizational 
activity; 
• The leadership domain, influence and team building skills. 
Hogan and Kaiser highlighted three points about this domain model: a) it is 
developmental; b) there is a hierarchy of increasing trainability; c) and it is 
comprehensive. The model can be used to identify potential leaders, but is rarely used in 
selecting corporate executives, including CEOs (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).  
 Companies often hire outside assessment centers which conduct tests that measure 
both cognitive ability and personality by applying structured interviews and simulations 
(Hogan et al., 1994). Nonetheless, when companies choose CEOs, they do not utilize 
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these services since other factors may be of more immediate importance. These services 
do not take into account the political realities surrounding the selection between board 
members and other stakeholders.  
However, unlike Hogan and Kaiser’s definition of leadership, the fact that an 
individual or group of leaders is able to emerge from within the group to direct it should 
not be ignored. Moreover, it cannot be denied that personality plays a significant role in 
leadership (job performance). Leadership personality impacts leadership style which in 
turn affects employee attitude, team functioning, and organizational performance (Hogan 
& Kaiser, 2005). 
  Mueller (Marsh, 1989) writes that the first priority of a 21st century leader is to 
develop a core team of highly qualified subordinates who can jointly cope with the 
problems and uncertainties they may encounter in the future. To achieve this, Zaleznik  
(Marsh, 1989) maintains that mentors of tomorrow’s leaders will have to take risks with 
people and bet initially on the perceived talent in younger people as they are better 
equipped to adapt to change and the competitive global market. 
 Personality plays an important role in determining leadership style and it has a 
direct bearing on both employee attitudes and on how teams function, thereby impacting 
the performance of the organization as a whole. It therefore follows that personality can 
be instrumental in predicting leadership effectiveness. However, because a numerical 
value cannot be placed on personality, stock price movement (Karuna, 2006) takes on 
importance in deciding whether or not the company has hired the right CEO. In other 
words, revenues as well as stock price changes reflect the CEO’s job performance over 
  
14 
time which, in turn, reflects leadership. Therefore, personality studies and trait theories 
need to be further analyzed. 
Problem Statement and Research Hypotheses  
 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for companies to survive in such a highly  
competitive world. Accordingly, employers are placing more emphasis on candidates 
having graduated from a prominent or well-known university, as this is indicative of their 
having received a quality education. Moreover, board members often retain strong alumni 
relations, and this often influences their selection of CEOs (Keiser, 2004). This is 
especially true in bureaucratic countries such as France, England, Japan, and Korea. To 
the mature staging industry, these factors seem to be more applicable than to the start-up 
staging industries such as IT (Information Technology). Recent studies of high 
technology industries have shown that:   
CEOs in higher technology industries are more inclined to have   
      backgrounds in research and development and tend to be younger than 
     CEOs in lower technology industries. Meanwhile, within the high 
      technology industries, organizations going through growth phases were 
      more apt to have CEOs with research and development backgrounds than 
      organizations in more mature phases, which tended to have CEOs with 
      backgrounds in administration, finance, and marketing. (Keiser, 2004, p. 56) 
 
The insurance industry used to be a more mature and conservative industry, but 
now appears to have undergone a rapid transformation, ever since the catalytic repealing 
of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 (Neale & Peterson, 2005). The insurance industry has 
grown into a more mature and conservative industry although it may be experiencing a 
few transformations since the catalytic repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. These 
companies are now more aggressive and rely heavily on new technologies such as the 
internet to market products and to serve customers. This paper therefore examines 
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whether or not the industry’s reliance upon new technologies has resulted in the hiring of 
younger CEOs. 
 The problem statement examines what relationship, if any, exists between a firm’s 
performance and a new CEO’s personality and leadership style, as well as his/her 
demographics of age, education, and prior experiences. 
 The following are the research hypotheses:   
1) Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education 
level, and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 
1999? 
2) Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school tier, degree, and 
prior experiences and the change in company’s performance? 
3) Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium or large 
based on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and 
tenure, and the change in company’s performance?  
4) Is there a difference in independent demographic factors (particularly in age, 
level of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance companies and 
their counterparts at other financial institutions such as banks and securities, 
or their counterparts at IT companies? 
 The validity of these hypotheses will be tested by comparing the demographics 
and job performances of new CEOs at regulated and unregulated companies during their 
tenure. Because the financial industries contain both regulated and unregulated 
characteristics, a close study of the CEOs of these companies is necessary to illustrate the 
relationship between leadership and performance. For the purpose of this research, the 
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population has been defined as U.S. companies in the insurance, securities, diversified 
financial, commercial banks, and IT industries that file financial statements with a 
government agency. 
Definition of Key Terms 
 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Legislation passed by Congress authorizing deposit 
insurance and prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. Under Glass-
Steagall, these banks were prohibited from investment banking activities, such as 
underwriting corporate securities or municipal revenue bonds. The law was designed to 
insulate bank depositors from the risk involved when a bank dealt in securities and to 
prevent a banking collapse like the one that occurred in the Great Depression (Downes & 
Goodman 1991).  
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Congress passed this act, also known as the 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, on November 4, 1999. This act removed 
most of the barriers that existed between the three different financial segments (banks, 
investment companies, and insurance companies) and allowed firms in these segments to 
cross-sell each other’s products on a much wider scale than previously allowed (Neale & 
Peterson, 2005). 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. A U.S. Act of Congress that regulates the 
actions of bank holding companies. It required Federal Reserve Board approval for the 
establishment of a bank holding company and prohibited bank holding companies 
headquartered in one state from acquiring a bank in another state (Downes & Goodman, 
1991).   
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Officer of a firm principally responsible for the 
activities of a company (Downes & Goodman, 1991). 
Chief Operating Officer (COO). Officer of a firm, usually the president or an 
executive vice president, responsible for daily management. Reports to CEO (Downes & 
Goodman, 1991). 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO). An executive officer who is responsible for 
handling funds, signing checks, keeping financial records, and financial planning 
(Downes & Goodman, 1991). 
Summary 
 
 Because of new technologies as well as increased competition, both from within 
and from outside the industry, CEOs must be able to sort through and analyze vast 
amounts of information. This requires considerable cognitive ability as well as higher 
education and training. Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure than ever before to act 
quickly, to recognize potential problems or opportunities and to take action immediately, 
which betrays a certain willingness to take risks. For these and other reasons, companies 
are turning to younger CEOs, as they are more familiar with new technologies, more 
open to new ideas and less reluctant to take necessary risks. But how much younger? And 
is age any more important than experience, expertise or reputation within a certain 
business field?  
 This study will try to answer these and other questions by examining the 
relationship between a company’s performance over time and a new CEO’s personality, 
age, education and prior experience. The goal is to establish a prediction model for 
companies to aid them in their selection process. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
  
Overview of the Insurance Industry 
 
 The insurance industry can be divided into two groups: property-casualty and life 
insurance companies. Because insurance products are so closely tied to public welfare, 
government regulation and protection are vital in today’s global market, as evidenced by 
the recent near collapse of American International Group’s (AIG) (Luhby, 2008). That is 
why the Federal government authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend 
AIG $85 billion to prevent them from filing bankruptcy. In return, the Federal Reserve 
Bank received a 79.9% stake in the company. If AIG had failed, it would have led to the 
collapse of other companies that they insure, some of them international, and this would 
have resulted not merely in a loss of jobs but also a loss of insurance policies that could 
not be replaced (Luhby, 2008). 
      The intervention of government is not new. During the Great Depression the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Neale & Peterson, 2005) separated investment and 
commercial banking activities. The main goals of the act were to regulate greedy banks in 
the pre-depression era, to separate the three financial sectors such as banks, investment 
companies, and insurance companies, to reduce excessive risk-taking by financial 
institutions, and to restore public confidence in the overall banking system.   
 In 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act gave states the authority to regulate the 
business of insurance without interference from federal regulation, unless federal law 
specifically provides otherwise. Because of this regulation, the insurance industry could 
reside comfortably inside a well protected castle compared with other financial 
institutions (Grace & Klein, 2008). 
  
19 
 In 1956, as an extension of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Holding Company 
Act was implemented to prevent financial conglomerates from having too much power. 
This act further separated financial activities by creating a wall between insurance and 
banking (Neale & Peterson, 2005).  
 On November 4, 1999 Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Yeager, et 
al., 2007), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act. This act deregulated 
the financial services industry by expanding the powers of financial institutions. Most of 
the barriers that existed between the three different financial sectors were removed. All 
three financial sectors were allowed to sell each other’s products and had access to a 
broader customer base. Essentially, this act allowed rapid consolidation of the industry.    
 According to classical economic theory, without any government regulation 
individual utility (satisfaction) would be maximized in the long run under perfect 
competition (Copeland & Weston, 1992). Even though perfect competition does not exist 
and may never have existed, there is still workable competition (Williams, 1987). In their 
paper, Neale and Peterson (2005) say that the enhanced competitiveness in the global 
economy, the broader customer base, and the potential for consolidation are expected to 
lead to greater profitability within the U.S. financial industry. 
 In order to answer the research questions, the following three areas need to be 
reviewed: (a) Leadership Theory based on personality, (b) the selection process of the 
new CEO, and (c) the announcement effect of the new CEO. When CEOs are replaced, 
questions are asked about the successor (Vancil, 1987). The CEO’s personality, his/her 
knowledge of the market and his firm, his prior experiences, and his demographic 
information are useful in analyzing and predicting the firm’s future direction.  
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Leadership Theories 
 
 When a company announces a new CEO, the media (Robbins, 2001) is quick to 
describe this person as charismatic, enthusiastic, a great motivator, or perhaps even 
savior. These terms are known as traits and allow for concise descriptions that can 
provoke a quick emotional response, especially among nervous shareholders or rival 
companies. The emphasis on personality is understandable since it has long been 
assumed that leaders are successful largely because of innate qualities, not merely 
because of their knowledge or experience: “A lot of companies gradually realize that a 
great leader is a great leader regardless of the industry. And great leadership is infinitely 
more difficult to teach than industry knowledge” (Carey & Ogden, 2000, p. 151)  
 However, there are many schools of thought in regards to leadership and its 
impact on and its role within a company. According to Jago (1982, p. 315), each has its 
limits in terms of practical application: “Multiple interpretations of leadership phenomena 
exist, each providing some insight into the role of leader but each remaining an 
incomplete and wholly inadequate explanation of complex relationship.” It is therefore 
helpful to analyze the various features of each before a more detailed discussion of the 
importance of personality as outlined in the leadership trait approach theory. 
Standard leadership theories. Leadership theories can be divided into three main 
categories. The first consists of the trait approach and the style approach, both of which 
define leadership from the leader’s point of view (Northouse, 2001). There are other 
schools of thought (situational leadership theory, contingency theory, and path-goal 
theory) that define leadership as the ability to adapt to the follower and the context. The 
third and final category (the leader-member exchange theory) defines leadership as an 
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interactive, dyadic relationship between both leaders and followers. There are, of course, 
notable differences between theories within the same category. For example, the style 
approach (Robbins, 2001) emphasizes the behavior of the leader, whereas the trait 
approach focuses on the personality characteristics of the leader.  
 According to the situational leadership approach (Northouse, 2001), effective 
leaders can accurately diagnose the current development level of subordinates in a task 
situation and then exhibit the prescribed leadership style that matches that situation. In 
other words, leaders analyze the conditions and change their leadership style to best suit 
the circumstance. Instead of dictating the environment, they adapt to it. 
Similarly, Fiedler’s contingency theory (Robbins, 2001) is also concerned with 
styles and situations and provides the framework for effectively matching the leader and 
the situation. It is a refined mixture of style approach and situational approach theories. 
Path-Goal theory, most of which was developed by House and Aditya (1997), 
examines how leaders motivate subordinates to accomplish designated goals. This theory 
illustrates how leaders can enhance employee performance and satisfaction by focusing 
on employee motivation. The underlying assumption (Northouse, 2001) is based on 
expectancy theory. That is to say, subordinates will be motivated if they think that they 
are capable of performing their work and that their efforts will result in a certain outcome 
or the payoffs for doing their work are worthwhile. 
The third category, leader-member exchange theory (LMX theory) (Robbins, 
2001), focuses on the leader-member relationship as a priority, and therefore effective 
communication in leader-member relationships is essential. This theory recognizes the 
existence of in-groups and out-groups within a group or organization. In-group members 
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are willing to do more than what is required in their job description and look for 
innovative ways to advance the group’s goal. In contrast, out-group members act strictly 
within their prescribed organizational roles. The leader’s role is to differentiate between 
in-group members and out-group members, giving the former (in-group members) more 
responsibilities, more opportunities, and more support. 
A fairly recent theory, the transformational leadership approach (Northouse, 
2001), does not fall directly into any of the above categories, but instead borrows many 
of their ideas. This approach examines the process by which certain leaders are able to 
inspire followers to accomplish great things. It is similar to trait theory in that it provides 
“individualized consideration and intellectual stimulation” and describes leaders who 
possess charisma (Robbins, 2001, p. 329).   
Leadership trait approach theory. Leadership trait approach theory was originally 
developed from a branch of psychology’s personality theories. This theory, unlike other 
personality theories that emphasize the importance of early childhood experience in 
personality development, focuses on the present, already developed adult personalities. 
Personality is defined as the sum of total ways in which an individual reacts and interacts 
with others. It has two important parts: (a) the unique differences that distinguish a 
person from everyone else and (b) its relatively stable and enduring quality (Robbins, 
2001). Personality can change and develop, but the degree to which change is possible is 
partly dependent upon age. Allport and Odbert believed that some traits are inherited and 
that each individual has a unique constellation of traits. On the other hand, by using 
factor analysis, Cattell claimed that the complexity of human personality could be 
explained with only twenty three traits (Morris & Maisto, 2005).  
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 However, recent scholars have insisted that five traits are sufficient: extroversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culture [openness to 
experience] (Robbins, 2001). They also claim that these Big Five dimensions of 
personality are reliable predictors of job performance, especially when other criteria such 
as technical skills and experience are considered. Judge et al. (2002) concluded that the 
five-factor model had multiple correlations with leadership, indicating strong support for 
the leader trait perspective as traits are organized according to the five-factor model. 
Also, each of these five traits has multiple facets. For example, agreeableness includes 
trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tenderness (Jang, Livesley, 
McCrae, Angleitner, & Riemann, 1998).   
 After reviewing the literature describing the relationship between personality and 
job performance, Barrick and Mount as cited in Judge, Bono, et al. (2002) determined 
that the validity of personality as a predictor of job performance is generally quite low. 
However, they admitted that when the previous studies were conducted, no well-accepted 
taxonomy existed for classifying personality traits. Therefore, it was not possible to 
determine whether or not there were consistent, meaningful relationships between 
particular personality constructs and performance criteria in different occupations. In 
response, Judge, Bono, et al. (2002) suggested replacing the words “job performance” 
with “leadership” in Barrick and Mount’s paper. In other words, personality is a predictor 
of leadership (Hogan & Kaiser 2005), but not necessarily job performance. 
 Leadership has two broad categories: leadership emergence and leadership 
effectiveness (Judge, Bono, et al., 2002). Leaders emerge when someone within a group 
is perceived as leader-like. Thus, leader emergence occurs when an individual is viewed 
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as a leader with only limited information about that individual’s performance. This is a 
within-group phenomenon. In contrast, leadership effectiveness refers to a leader’s 
performance in influencing and guiding the activities of his unit toward achievement of 
its goals. This is a between-groups phenomenon.  
 In a Harvard working paper (Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand, 2001), three scholars 
argued that the debate question, “Does leadership matter?” might be misdirected. They 
said that the question should be, “When does leadership matter?” They showed that the 
impact of CEOs differed markedly by industry, and that CEOs have the most significant 
impact where opportunities are scarce or where CEOs have slack resources. Thus, their 
study showed that a CEO’s impact is different depending on type of industry and firm 
size. 
 The basic premise (Northouse, 2001) is that human behavior can be summarized 
by a few traits. Psychologists say that a trait is a dimension of personality used to 
categorize people according to the degree to particular characteristic. In other words, 
traits are building blocks of personality. Traits occur in combinations, and these 
combinations make each person unique. Traits are organized hierarchically based on how 
much they influence behavior. People can have more of a trait by demonstrating their 
behavior more frequently with more intensity across a wider range of situation.  
 Psychologists (Morris & Maisto, 2005) say that traits describe individual 
difference; people respond to the same situation in different ways. They also insist that 
traits are bipolar; for any trait, there is an opposite. 
 The trait theories of leadership – theories that sought personality, social, physical, 
or intellectual attributes that differentiated leaders from non-leaders – date back to the 
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1930s (Robbins, 2001). During this time, research concentrated on determining the 
specific traits that clearly differentiated leaders from followers. People assumed potential 
leaders could be identified by observing certain traits. Some of these traits, it was 
reasoned, could be honed through training and practice, but one still had to be born with 
the potential. Leaders could be made, but only if they were born with the right stuff 
(Northouse, 2001). 
 The trait theories were one of the first systematic attempts to study leadership. In 
the mid-1900s, research challenged the theories by questioning the universality of 
leadership traits. The cumulative findings from more than half a century of research lead 
to a conclusion that although some traits may increase the propensity of success as a 
leader, none of the traits guarantee success (Robbins, 2001).  
 In a major review in 1948, Stogdill suggested that no consistent set of traits 
differentiated leaders from non-leaders across a variety of situations (Northouse, 2001). 
He said that an individual with leadership traits might be a leader in one situation, but not 
in another. Rather than being a quality that individuals possessed, leadership was re-
conceptualized as a relationship between people in a social situation. Personal factors 
related to leadership continued to be important, but researchers contended that these 
factors were to be considered as relative to the requirements of the situation (Morris & 
Maisto, 2005). 
 Leadership research began with an emphasis on identifying the qualities (traits) of 
great individuals. Then it shifted to include the impact of situations on leadership. Most 
currently, it has emphasized the behavioral styles of leaders (Robbins, 2001).  
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 Leadership can be viewed as a trait or set of traits (Jago, 1982). In other words, 
leadership can be viewed as a measurable and quantifiable property possessed by 
different people in different amounts. Alternatively, it is possible to focus on observable 
leader behaviors rather than on inherent traits. From this perspective, leadership exists 
primarily in the actions of the leader. Furthermore, it seems certain background 
characteristics (Marsh, 1989) can also be associated with leadership capability. Marsh 
quoted Burack’s research in his dissertation paper: 
     Leaders, if not born, seem to be made early in their lives by their 
      experiences up to and including high school. While a clear answer to the 
      question is yet to be determined, indications are that there exist basic 
      characteristics in people which can readily develop into necessary 
      leadership qualities under the proper conditions. If these basic ingredients 
      are not present, training for leadership might well be misplaced. (p. 94) 
 
 While no one can argue that good leaders have most or all of the good traits, it is 
easy to find effective leaders who have at least some of these traits. Likewise, it is also 
easy to find people who exhibit nearly all of these traits, but who are terrible leaders. So 
effectiveness and efficiency of leadership would be inadequate until personal and 
situational characteristics have been integrated, as Stogdill (1948) predicted.  
 Although the trait theories are neither accurate nor enough, they do provide 
valuable information about leadership. They can be applied to individuals at all levels and 
in all types of organizations. Although a definitive set of traits is not provided by the trait 
approach (Northouse, 2001), the approach does provide direction in regards to which 
traits are good to have if one aspires to take a leadership position. By taking personality 
tests and other similar questionnaires, individuals can gain insight into whether or not 
they have certain traits deemed important for leadership, and they can pinpoint their 
strengths and weaknesses.    
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 Managers can use information from the trait approach theory to assess where they 
stand within their organization and what they need to do to strengthen their position 
(Northouse, 2001). It can suggest areas in which their personal characteristics are very 
beneficial to the company and areas in which they may wish to receive more training to 
enhance their overall approach. Managers can then further develop a deeper 
understanding of who they are and how they will affect others in the organization. 
 According to her dissertation paper regarding personality traits of executive 
women (Gmelin, 2005), the personality scores of executive women are consistent with 
leadership trait theory. The issue is leadership style caused by personality. 
 Many scholars believe that the CEO’s personality is a critical and influential 
factor in the firm (Miller & Droge, 1986). Miller and Droge assert that the CEO’s 
personality impact is greater in small and young firms than in large and old firms (banks 
and government included) for the firm’s performance. We can expect the impact of the 
CEO to be direct and pervasive. 
 The CEO as a high achiever (Miller & Droge, 1986) influences the firm’s 
structure. So the need for achievement in personality is a critical factor for the successful 
companies. 
 The analysis of CEO’s traits (personality) (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) is more 
important than ever before for successfully implementing major organizational objectives 
based on inside and outside environmental changes. Even though those traits are very 
subjective and unique to CEOs, and the traits are very tough to convert into numbers for 
each potential CEO in order to predict who the right CEO would be for the company, 
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fortunately some demographic factors and past experiences through the CEO’s biography 
could be used as proxies to predict the firm’s future. 
 The CEO’s intelligence and mental abilities (Morris & Maisto, 2005) are partly 
heredity and partly where and how he has grown up – education, family, and work 
environment, etc. Schmidt and Hunter (Judge, et al., 2004) proclaimed that intelligence is 
the most important trait or construct in all of psychology, and the most successful trait in 
applied psychology. They said that intelligence is one of the best predictors of general job 
performance. In the complex jobs, the relationship between intelligence and performance 
is stronger. 
 In a Gallup Poll before the 2000 presidential election (Judge, et al., 2004), 90% of 
Americans responded that the candidate should understand complex issues. Judge, et al.  
(2004) cite Lord, Foti, and De Vader, who found that intelligence was the only attribute 
that is seen as a critical feature that must be possessed by all leaders. They also concluded 
that intelligence is a key characteristic in predicting leadership perceptions. But Rubin, 
Bartels, and Bommer (Judge, et al., 2004) argued that intelligence was more strongly 
related to perceived intellectual competence of the leader than to leadership emergence. 
 Locke (Judge, et al., 2004) argued that cognitive ability to gather, integrate, and 
interpret enormous amounts of information is important for leaders as decision makers. 
Leadership also requires a considerable measure of creativity, which is, in turn, a    
reflection of a leader’s intelligence. Leaders generate creative solutions on their own and 
may stimulate follower creativity through follower intrinsic motivation and high quality 
leader-member exchange. 
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  Rushton (Judge, et al., 2004) concluded that creativity and intelligence are 
distinct, but related, constructs. He said that intelligent leaders are not only better 
problem solvers, but they are also more likely to become creative and foster the creativity 
of their followers. 
      If people believe that leaders are endowed with certain characteristics, then when 
people observe these characteristics in others, they infer leadership or leadership potential 
to exist. Rubin et al. (Judge, et al., 2004) noted that individuals seem to share a common 
understanding about the traits that leaders possess and these traits are used as benchmarks 
for deciding emergent leadership. 
      Fiedler and Garcia’s cognitive resource theory (Judge, et al., 2004) assume that 
intelligence and experience and other cognitive resources are factors in leadership 
success. In order to predict leadership success, the level of stress as well as cognitive 
capabilities must be considered. Their theory predicts that a leader’s cognitive ability 
contributes to followers’ performance only when a leader communicates using directive 
behavior.   
      At the same time, stress (Robbins, 2001) affects the intelligence-decision quality 
relationship. The theory predicts that a leader’s experience is positively correlated with 
decision quality under high stress. Therefore, a CEO’s past experience or expertise is 
highly significant in solving the problems his or her company faces. Fiedler and Garcia 
(Robbins, 2001) also propose that leader intelligence and experience is irrelevant for 
simple tasks. 
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      If the above theory is correct, we can conclude that intellect, emotional 
motivation, competence, and self discipline are among the most important personality 
traits for a successful CEO. 
      Before repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, barriers to the entry of new firms into a 
market were high in the insurance industry. Barriers to the entry (Leftwich & Eckert, 
1985) may be inherent in the nature of the market or existing firms and government units 
may have erected them. That is, they may either be natural or artificial. The Glass-
Steagall Act itself (Downes & Goodman, 1991) made CEOs in the insurance industry less 
competitive compared with those in the IT and software industries, although it does not 
mean that they were less intellectual or less competent. But their decision making choices 
had been considerably less than those in other rapid changing industries. 
The CEO Selection Process  
 
 A Board of Directors must select a CEO who can maximize the firm’s value.  
Without any doubt, the Board of Directors (Carey & Ogden, 2000) tries to find the CEO 
by considering the firm’s current situation and its future growth and direction. According 
to Joos, et al. (2003), four factors should be considered: effort, risk, human capital, and 
horizon. Depending upon the firm’s situation, the Board of Directors will have to select 
the new CEO based upon the four factors criteria. The most idealistic candidate (Joos, et 
al., 2003) would be low effort averse, low risk averse, long horizontal, and most 
knowledgeable in both the general and the specific management approaches that relate to 
the firm and the industry. In other words, a Board of Directors requires a sincere, 
trustworthy, aggressive, younger but experienced, intelligent and intellectual CEO. 
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      Although all four factors are typically unobservable to outsiders (Joos, et al., 
2003), each factor is correlated with the incoming CEO’s age and the type of firm. The 
effort averse factor is directly related to the agency’s problem dealing in the corporate 
finance area (Copeland & Weston, 1992). Because a CEO works as an agent for the 
stockholders, there is no guarantee that the CEO will always act in their best interest. In 
most firms, nontrivial monitoring costs from the owners’ pockets incur to keep the CEO 
in line. However, if the CEO has a certain amount of ownership in the firm, monitoring 
costs can be reduced. 
      Start-ups, high growth, and financially distressed firms (Joos, et al., 2003) tend to 
hire younger CEOs. Each company has different attitudes toward risk, depended upon the 
firm’s financial health. Even though a CEO is low risk averse, he can have a limited 
option to take action if the firm is not financially strong. The Board of Directors closely 
monitors the CEO even though executive compensation contracts address managerial 
incentive problems. Therefore riskier firms tend to appoint younger CEOs (Joos, et al., 
2003).  
 Due to the CEO’s compensation plan (Joos, et al., 2003), there is some 
relationship between the CEO’s age and the firm’s growth option. So if the firm has long-
term growth projects, the firm will tend to engage a younger CEO. 
     Since a CEO’s general management skills, along with firm and industry-specific 
knowledge, increase with firm size, there is a positive correlation between firm size and 
the CEO’s age (Joos, et al., 2003). Those skills are normally obtained from prior 
experience through jobs. Thus, high-tech firms require younger CEOs to be more familiar 
with the emerging technologies in their industry. The CEOs of regulated firms that 
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operate under more constrained opportunity sets tend to be younger when hired if the 
firms do not require general management and firm-specific knowledge. However, if the 
regulated firms require industry-specific knowledge, then the CEO’s tend to be older 
(Joos, et al., 2003). 
     Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino (2002) say that utility CEOs tend to be older when 
appointed to office and graduate from less prestigious schools with legal backgrounds 
when compared to CEOs of unregulated firms. Their interpretation is that managerial 
talent and effort are not very important factors of job performance. They also found that 
utility firms rarely appoint outsiders as CEOs. 
 Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) suggest that environmental contingencies affect the 
replacement of CEOs. In other words, organizations tend to select CEOs to handle 
current organizational problems. For example, if firms face uncertainty and instability 
derived from competitive interdependence, these firms will likely select new CEOs from 
within the industry – from competing firms – in an effort to reduce their competitive 
uncertainty. 
      When powerful CEOs (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) appoint new board members, 
they select demographically similar ones. If this is true, incumbent board members will 
choose the new CEO based upon similar demographic factors. According to Westphal 
and Zajac there is a certain amount of bias in the selection process: 
      Social psychological studies on performance evaluation and hiring practices   
     consistently find bias in evaluation decisions in which the parties are 
      demographically similar. In experimental and field research on hiring 
      decisions, studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between 
      applicant-rater similarity and the perceived quality of the applicant. (p. 61)  
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 Additional evidence suggests that similarity frequently enhances interpersonal 
attraction (Bryne, Clore, & Worchel, 1966; Bryne, 1971). Early interpretations of these 
findings invoked a reinforcement model, arguing that similarity provides mutual 
reinforcement or consensual validation of each individual’s beliefs, thus enhancing 
interpersonal attraction and producing bias in evaluation decisions. 
      When the board of directors selects the new CEO, it is natural to select one with 
similar demographic factors, functional background, age, educational level, and 
insider/outsider status (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Even though the new CEO is selected 
in the company’s best interest, the market could perceive and judge that CEO differently. 
     A change of CEO is affected by various factors such as competition between top 
managers, the role of the Board of Directors, and large blockholders. Warner, Watts, and 
Wruck (1988) said that if a firm selects an outsider, the benefits must be greater than the 
costs, otherwise insiders’ incentives may diminish and employee morale might suffer. 
Moreover, the search for an outsider is a considerable expense for any company and 
therefore the selection of an outsider usually occurs when the company enters or expands 
into new areas in which the firm has no specific human capital. 
      Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) argue that firms tend to promote new 
CEOs from within. Outsiders are said to be handicapped. In order to become a new CEO 
as an outsider, that CEO must outperform insider candidates. Firms with a product, or 
line of business organizational structure, are likely to choose an insider as their CEO. 
     Carey and Ogden (2000) insist that strong boards must make rigid and systematic 
CEO selection standards and link the development of their succession plans to the new 
CEO’s compensation. At the same time, the boards need to establish a Global 
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Intelligence comprehensive evaluation system to review the talented executives both 
from inside and outside the company in order to increase the probability of a successful 
succession of the new CEO.  
The Announcement Effect of a New CEO on the Stock Market 
 
      The stock market immediately reflects the firm’s value based on the perception 
and reputation of the new CEO. The large institutional investment company’s analysts 
rather than individual investors, judge the new CEO when they buy or sell the firm’s 
stocks. When a company first announces a new CEO, the market studies and judges the 
CEO based upon his past experiences and accomplishments, leadership style, and 
personality based on social and industrial and organizational psychology (Morris & 
Maisto, 2005). The market judges whether or not the new CEO can act as a decision 
maker and handle the firm’s current and future problems. If the company has existing 
problems, then the market asks if he is the right person for the job. 
     Other scholars (Warner, et al., 1988) begin their arguments with the major 
hypothesis that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock 
price performance. Whenever a CEO is hired or fired, the capital markets react to that 
news. Even though the wealth effect for stockholders caused by appointments of new 
CEOs (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987) is small, the significance is meaningful. Furtado and 
Rozeff found that internal promotions gave good signals to the capital markets rather than 
external ones due to the existence of firm-specific human capital and the higher 
information costs associated with external hire. At the same time it minimizes the internal 
disruption during a change of the CEO (Vancil, 1987). For small companies, the 
frequency of internal promotion tends to decline due to less well-developed labor markets 
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(Furtado & Rozeff, 1987). Accordingly, the announcement and dismissal effects of a 
CEO in the stock market are directly related to shareholder wealth maximization. 
     In selecting candidates for the CEO position from both the inside and outside, 
macro and micro factors should be considered. Micro factors are firm-specific and macro 
factors are, in general, non-firm specific. Under limited competition as is found in 
insurance and utility industries, micro factors are considered more important than macro-
factors. On the other hand, under unlimited competition, macro factors are considered 
more important than micro-factors. Therefore, Hi-Tech industries may select their CEO 
from the outside more comfortably than a CEO from the inside (Joos, et al., 2003).   
      Warner, et al. (1988) claim that stock returns are a potential source of 
information, even though the top managers’ impact on establishing the firm’s value is not 
directly observable. They maintain stock return itself is a noisy measure of management 
performance and is influenced by other exogenous factors. In other words, stock return 
cannot incorporate all the information about management performance. They hypothesize 
that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock price 
performance. Changes in management are followed by poor stock performance. They 
claim that:    
Abnormal stock return at announcement is the sum of two components. One is an 
information component that is negative if the change signals worse management 
performance than anticipated. The second is a real component that is positive if 
the change is in shareholders’ interest. A positive net effect is expected only if the 
real component is larger in absolute value than the information component. 
(Warner, et al., 1988, p. 466) 
 
They then conclude that there is usually no average stock price reaction detected at the 
announcement date. 
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      However, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) say that Warner, et al.’s result was partly 
contaminated due to the inclusion of a large number of executive retirements and 
departures, and should have been limited only to the appointment of a new CEO. 
Empirical research regarding stock price reaction to management change gives 
conflicting results about the possible benefits of internal mechanisms of corporate 
control. 
Summary 
 
 In order to ensure that a company evaluating CEO candidates will choose the one 
who is most qualified and capable, the following three areas need to be reviewed: (a) 
Leadership Theory based on personality, (b) the selection process of the new CEO, and 
(c) the announcement effect of the new CEO. When CEOs are replaced, questions are 
asked about the successor. The CEO’s personality, his/her knowledge of the market and 
his firm, his prior experiences, and his demographic information are useful in analyzing 
and predicting the firm’s future direction. 
 The CEO’s personality is a critical and influential factor in the firm. The analysis 
of CEO’s traits (personality) is more important than ever before for successfully 
implementing major organizational objectives based on inside and outside environmental 
changes. Even though those traits are very subjective and unique to CEOs, and the traits 
are very tough to convert into numbers for each potential CEO in order to predict who the 
right CEO would be for the company, fortunately some demographic factors and past 
experiences through the CEO’s biography could be used as proxies to predict the firm’s 
future. 
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 Since a CEO’s general management skills, along with firm and industry-specific 
knowledge, increase with firm size, there is a positive correlation between firm size and 
the CEO’s age. Those skills are normally obtained from prior experience through jobs. 
In brief, the above argument can be summarized into a simple multiple regression model 
as follows: 
Company’s performance = age + education level /quality + prior experience + 
origin (insider/outsider) + tenure + Є (CEO’s personality and leadership style 
+other factors) 
However since the CEO’s personality and leadership style could not be assigned 
numbers, “Є” was used to denote the CEO’s personality and leadership style. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
Problem Statement 
 
 What relationship, if any, exists between a firm’s performance and a new CEO’s 
personality and leadership style, as well as his/her demographics of age, education, and 
prior experiences? 
Research Hypotheses 
 
 Research hypothesis 1. Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’ 
age, their education level, and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1999? 
(*The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was legislation passed by Congress authorizing deposit 
insurance and prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. President Bill 
Clinton repealed the act in 1999. The repealing of the act reduced the constraints in the 
financial industry, thus rendering more competition among financial companies.) 
 Specific hypotheses: 
1. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s age before 
and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
2. There is/is not a significant difference in the education levels of newly-hired 
CEOs in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1999.  
 3. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s tenure 
before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
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Method 
The sample size consists of 110 incoming CEOs from 48 companies in the 
insurance industry during the period 1988 to 2006. 
For specific hypothesis 1, a two-sample t-test was used is to compare the means 
of two populations (groups) by taking independent samples from each. This is sometimes 
referred to as a parallel-groups design (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978). The mean 
represents the center of the population. If the means are different, then the populations are 
different. Other parameters of the two populations (such as the variance) are also 
considered when performing this analysis. 
 First, the means and variances for the CEOs’ age, education level, and tenure pre- 
and post- 1999 were obtained. The means were then analyzed and the differences 
calculated. Then the differences in the means were tested for statistical significance using 
a t-test, where the critical value α =0.05. It is assumed that the true difference between the 
means is zero. 
 For specific hypothesis 2, chi-square test (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978) was 
employed. 
A chi square statistic was used to investigate whether distributions of categorical 
variables differ from one another. Here education level is a categorical variable. 
Eventually each categorical variable is expressed in numerical form. On page 51, a CEO 
who has a master degree or above is categorized as “0” and a CEO with a bachelor 
degree or less is categorized as “1”. 
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 This allows for a 2 x 2 contingency table comprising the number of CEOs who 
have a master degree or above and number of CEOs with a bachelor degree or less, pre 
and post the GBL Act. 
 For specific hypothesis 3, the same two-sample t-test used in specific hypothesis 1 
was used to compare the means of two populations (groups) by taking independent 
samples from each. 
Research hypothesis 2. Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school 
tier, degree and prior experiences and the change in company’s performance?  
Specific hypotheses: 
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the 
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. 
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and 
the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. 
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity 
and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. 
Method 
The sample size consists of 214 incoming CEOs from 120 companies in the 
financial industry during the period 1988 to 2006.  Multiple regression analysis was used 
for studying the straight-line relationships among two or more variables. In the more 
general multiple regression model, there are p independent variables: 
 
 The xes are the independent variables. The y is the dependent variable. The ßs are the 
unknown regression coefficients. The critical value α is 0.05. 
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The following models were used: 
• Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + 
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
• Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + 
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
• Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + 
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
Research hypothesis 3. Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small, 
medium, or large based on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin 
(insider/outsider) and tenure, and the change in company’s performance?  
Specific hypotheses: 
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and  
      the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
 2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and        
      the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.   
 3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity   
     and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure. 
Method 
 Same Multiple Regression Analysis was used for studying the straight-line 
relationships among two or more variables. The critical value α is 0.05. 
The following models were used: 
• Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)+ 
β7 (Tenure) + Є 
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• Yt (Change in stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)  
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є 
• Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5 (Firm Size)  
+ β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є  
Research hypothesis 4. Is there a difference in demographic independent factors 
(particularly in age, level of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance 
companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies? 
Specific hypotheses: 
1. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of 
age among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other 
financial institutions and IT companies. 
2. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of 
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their 
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
3. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of 
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both 
other financial institutions and IT companies. 
Method 
 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was used to compare the means of 
each independent nominal variable such as age, level of education, and tenure among 
CEOS in insurance companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions 
and IT companies. ANOVA is simply an extension of the t-test. ANOVA calculates an F 
statistic or F ratio.  
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where RSSi is the residual sum of squares of model i. F here is distributed as an F-
distribution, with (p2 − p1, n − p2) degrees of freedom. Here the critical value α is 0.05. 
Methodology 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the stock price movements that subsequently follow the 
announcement of the new CEOs are related to reputation (Karuna, 2006) - skills, 
capabilities, and performances - which in turn are derived from unique leadership. 
Furthermore, leadership style is related to personal traits as well as other demographic 
factors that include: age, level of education  (school tier and type of degree), prior 
experiences (whether as a Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
or otherwise), the size of the firm, the new CEO’s origin (whether as an insider/outsider), 
and tenure.  
 There are limitations in this study. Because a company’s performance is not 
solely depended on one CEO’s leadership, we have to add each division’s head in the 
organization to this study in order to get the clear result. A CEO has a power to hire a 
core team of unusually qualified persons (Marsh, 1989) in order to cope with the 
problems and uncertainties in the future. 
Sample selection. The population is made up of U.S. companies in the insurance, 
 securities, diversified financial, commercial banks, and IT industries that file financial 
statements with a government agency.  
      First, sample companies are chosen from the 2007 annual edition of Fortune 
magazine’s “Fortune 1000” companies. Companies are ranked by revenue. The sample 
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size is 264 incoming CEOs from 120 companies from 1988 to 2006.  The sample size of 
financial industry consists of 214 incoming CEOs from 95 companies whereas that of the 
insurance consists of 110 incoming CEOs from 48 companies, and sample size of IT 
industry consists of 50 incoming CEOs from 25 companies. However, depending upon 
each hypothesis, sample sizes are different because of insufficient data.  For example, an 
incoming CEO’s age was not available but tenure was available in one set of data. Hence 
the sample sizes are different in the output of tests in chapter 4.  
 Companies were excluded if those companies are delisted from stock exchanges 
through merger, acquisition, or change of company’s structure. All statistical data, such 
as company revenues, were obtained from numbers reported by Fortune magazine, 
Standard & Poor’s Net Advantage, and Yahoo! Finance. The NCSS 2001 statistic 
software package was used to analyze the collected data. Other demographical data were 
obtained from online sources such as Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, LexisNexis 
Academics, Reuters, Yahoo! Finance, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on line, and U.S. News 
and World Report. CEO’s name, age, prior experience, and tenure were mainly collected 
from LexisNexis Academic. 
IRB approval. The researcher completed the National Institutes of Health’s Web-
based training course, “Protecting Human Research Participants,” sponsored by the NIH 
Office of Human Subjects Research on March 26, 2008. The researcher obtained IRB 
approval to proceed with the research. The study was considered exempt as the research 
was limited to secondary data available to the public in books, periodicals and on-line 
resources. The study did not involve personal interviews or surveys. 
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Test Measures  
 
Dependent Variable(s): 
• Change in revenue – Observe change in revenue during new CEO’s 
tenure.  
• Change in stock price – Observe stock price changes during new CEO’s 
tenure.  
• Change in return on equity – Observe the change in return on equity 
during new CEO’s tenure. Return on equity is the amount, expressed as a 
percentage, earned on a company’s common stock investment for a given 
period. It is calculated by dividing common stock equity (net worth) at the 
beginning of the accounting period into net income for the period after 
preferred stock dividends but before common stock dividends (Downes & 
Goodman, 1991).  
Independent Variable(s): 
• Age – the new CEO’s age his first year in office 
• Level of education – the school tier and type of degree obtained 
a) School Tier – school rank, according to U.S. News and World 
Report  
b) Type of Degree – Bachelors, Masters, Ph.D, etc. 
• New CEO’s prior experiences and expertise – previous job positions, such 
as Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), CEO of 
another company or other 
• Company size rank – determined by annual revenue in the Fortune. 
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• Insider/Outsider – whether the new CEO is from within the firm or is an 
outsider. 
• Tenure – the period the new CEO is in office (the length of time that new 
CEO position is occupied) 
Test Models 
 
 The following three regression models were used: 
• Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School  
Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6 
(Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є 
• Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 
(School  Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm 
Size) + β6  (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є 
• Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 
(School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) 
+  β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є 
    For the characteristics of these data, multiple regression analysis with dummy 
variables was used. A dummy variable or indicator variable (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978) 
is any variable in a regression equation that takes on a finite number of variables for the 
purpose of identifying different categories of a nominal variable. Examples of dummy 
variables include the following:  
1 if the school is in tier 1  
β2 =  
     0     if the school is in tier 2 
 
   -1     if the school is in tier 3 or 4 
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School tiers are based on data from U.S. News and World Report (2006)  
 
 
     1      if CEO has a BA (AB) /BS degree or below 
 
β3 = 
    
     0      if CEO has a Master degree or above 
  
 Some CEOs have a BS degree in accounting, economics, political science,  
social science, finance, business, commerce, law or industrial management. However,  
those BS degrees are changed to BA degrees. A BA degree in engineering, applied  
math, or statistics is changed to BS degree. 
           In the graduate degree, a MS degree in operation research, industrial  
 
management, finance, banking, management, management information, or actuarial  
 
study is equivalent to MBA degree.  
 
 
      1      if CEO was previously a COO (Chief Operating Officer) 
 
β4 =      0      otherwise 
 
     -1      if CEO was previously a CFO (Chief Financial Officer) 
 
 
      1      if firm size is below rank 300 according to Fortune magazine 
 
β5 =      0      if firm size is above rank 301, but below 700 
          
   -1      if firm size is above rank 701, but below 1000 
 
 
  
      1      if the CEO is from inside, or within, the firm 
 
β6 = 
0 if the CEO is from outside the firm 
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       Before becoming a CEO, if he/she was not at the company, the CEO is regarded as 
an outsider even though most of his time was spent at that company. For example, CEO 
A spent most of his life in company X before moving to Company Y. He returns to 
company X to be a CEO after spending two years in company Y. In this case he is still 
regarded as an outsider. 
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Chapter 4 – Results 
 
 The following is an examination of the findings related to the research 
hypotheses in Chapter 3. Each research hypothesis and its null hypothesis is presented 
followed by the findings, which are displayed in both table and visual form. 
Research Hypothesis 1 
 
      Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education level, 
and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999? 
(*The Glass- Steagall Act of 1933 was legislation authorizing deposit insurance and 
prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. President Clinton repealed 
the Act in 1999, reducing the constraints in the financial industry and thus rendering 
more competition among financial companies.) 
Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance 
CEO’s age before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. 
 Appendix A shows that there was an increase of approximately three years in the 
average age of new CEOs following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. The 
time frame for this comparison is from 1988 to 2006. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly older than the average age of 
new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation, previous CEOs’ offspring and 
relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated firms are less complex and 
easier to manage (Joos, et al., 2003). The value of α is 0.031, which is less than the 5% 
critical level. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis.  
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1 
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 There is a significant difference in a new insurance CEO’s age before and after 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. 
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant difference in the education 
levels of newly-hired CEOs in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
 The number of CEOs who have a graduate degree or an undergraduate degree is 
shown in Table 1. At a value of α = 0.157, which is greater than the 5 percent critical 
level, there is not a significant difference therefore the alternate hypothesis is rejected. 
Chi square was used to test the specific hypothesis 2.  
Table 1   
 
CEO’s Education Level Pre and Post GBL (1999) 
 
                           Before GBL After GBL 
Bachelor 39 14 
Graduate 31 23 
    
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2. 
 There is not a significant difference in the education levels of newly-hired CEOs 
in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
 As Table 2 shows, since 1988 an increasing number of incoming CEOs have more 
MBA degrees. As explained in the previous chapter, the incoming CEOs are becoming 
more professional. The securities industry has the highest proportion, 55 % of CEOs with 
MBA, followed by commercial banks (44%), and diversified financial industry (39%) in 
the financial industries. The industry with the lowest percentage of CEOs with MBAs is 
healthcare (20%) and the property and casualty insurance industry with 21%. 
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The above data are not surprising given the CEO’s role as decision-maker in the 
rapidly changing and highly competitive world of business. Today a CEO must have a 
professional education background to know how to process information and act upon it, or 
to predict how competitors might act if given the same data. MBA degrees give future 
CEOs the thinking skills necessary to put fundamental business concepts and theories into 
practice.   
Table 2     
The CEOs Who Had an MBA Degree vs. Non MBA Degree Between 1988 and 2006 
                               # of Companies    # of CEOs     # of MBA         # of non-
MBA                                
                                                                                                                       (MS) 
P & C    23  47    10 (21%)                11 
Life & Health   14  38          12 (32%)                   8 
Healthcare   11  25            5 (20%)                   5 
Commercial Bank  23  54          24(44%)                    7 
Diversified Financial  11  28          11(39%)                    7 
Securities   13  22          12(55%)                    2 
Information Technology   6  16            2(13%)                  (6)  
Computer Software    7  17             4(24%)                 (2) 
Internet Services and 
Retailing                        7   9              4(44%)                 (2) 
Financial Data Services  5  8      4(50%)                   0 
 
 
• # of CEOs who have only BA/BA or below are not counted on the above table. 
 
• (  %) is a percentage of # of MBA / # of CEOs 
 
• ( ) is # of MS degree. 
 
Most finance major graduate students with MBA degrees join high paying security 
and investment companies as well as diversified financial companies on Wall Street 
(Myser, 2009) and in commercial bank areas. This trend is partly due to the atmosphere 
within these industries and the professional knowledge that is required because of the 
complexity of the work itself. The security industry in particular must compete with 
  
52 
investment companies throughout the world by using quick and precise judgment. 
Moreover, the CEOs in this industry must have multi-dimensional intelligence to digest and 
to overcome in order to endure the higher stress level.   
 The educational data for the IT industries in Table 2 show that CEOs in the IT 
industry have fewer MBA degrees than their counterparts in the financial industries. On 
the other hand, the IT industry has a higher number of CEOs with MS degrees.  
 Similarly, the financial data services and the internet service and retailing 
companies have a higher proportion of CEOs with MBA degrees than do their 
counterparts in computer software and information technology, no doubt because of the 
nature of the work itself. Financial data services and internet service and retailing are 
more business oriented and much more competitive than information technology 
companies, who are often forced to specialize, thus having fewer direct competitors.  
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance 
CEO’s tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
 Appendix B shows the result of two-sample test for CEOs’ adjusted tenure. The 
tenure of a current incumbent CEO is based on year 2006. However, adjusted tenure is 
excluded if a current CEO has continued to serve in this capacity for less than 7 years.  In 
other words, current CEOs are not included unless they have served in this capacity (for 
the same company) for at least seven years.   
 The results show that since 1999, 30 percent of CEOs are still working as CEOs 
for the same company, so tenure cannot yet be determined. As previously mentioned, the 
period after 1999 (6 years) is far shorter than the period before 1999 (12 years), so the 
data may not be unbiased. This study does not include data from 2007 and 2008, mainly 
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because of the current recession, which began in 2007. The thinking here is that in many 
cases the performance of CEOs often had little or nothing to do with the performance or 
failure of a business. 
             As Appendix B shows, the value of α is 0.000, which is less than the 5% critical 
level.  Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. However, because of the shorter period 
range after 1999, this result might be inconclusive. However, if we assume that CEOs 
hired after 1999 remain in this position for five more years, the average, approximately 
10.569  years (5.569  + 5.0), is still much  less than the average of those hired before 
1999, approximately 15 years (14.958).  As expected, the average tenure of CEOs is 
decreasing significantly.  
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3. 
 There is a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s tenure before and 
after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  
Research Hypothesis 2 
 
 Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school tier, degree, 
and prior experiences and the change in company’s performance?  
Specific hypotheses 
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the 
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.  
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and 
the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. 
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity 
and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.  
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Method 
 The following models were used: 
• Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + 
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
• Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + 
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
• Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +  
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є 
 In multiple regression output, the coefficient of determination, R2, is a useful tool 
which gives the proportion of the variance of dependent variable that is predictable from 
the independent variables. The coefficient of determination is a measure to determine 
how much the dependent variable can be predicted using a certain model. For example, if 
R2 is 0.46, it means that 46 percent of the total variation in Y can be explained by the 
linear relationship between X and the values of Y in the regression model. The rest 0.54 
(54%) of the total variation in Y cannot be explained.  
 R, correlation coefficient, may be defined either as a ratio or a percentage. Since 
we use the percentage form, its values can range from minus one to one. A value of R 
near 0.0 indicates no linear relationship between the Y and the Xs, while a value near 1.0 
indicates a perfect linear fit. Although popular, R should not be used indiscriminately or 
interpreted without scatter plot support for each of independent variables. Moreover, it is 
important to check the F-ratio in the analysis of variance to see if correlation is 
significant. 
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 The company performance data are based on each company’s fiscal year. For 
example, in the financial industry, 99% of the companies have accounting periods that 
end on December 31st of each year. However, the accounting periods in IT and software 
industries often vary, with some periods ending on March 31, June 30, or January 31, etc. 
 Therefore, for example, if a CEO is appointed on September 1, 2000 the 
company’s performance is based on year 2001 when that company’s accounting period 
ends on December 31. In other words, the figures for 2000 belong to the prior CEO. 
However, if a CEO is appointed on July 1st on exactly middle of a year the company 
performance data are assigned to both CEOs. 
 Even though some companies were listed as Fortune 1000 companies, these 
companies are excluded if they are acquired by or have merged with other companies, or 
if they have been de-listed (dropped) from the stock market because of a change in  the 
company’s structure (i.e. from stock company to mutual company). The company’s 
performance data unit is a million dollar.  
Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in revenue and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new 
CEOs. 
 Appendix C gives the output of the model in the following equation: Yt (Change 
revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior 
Experiences) + Є. The output is displayed to explain the relationship between the change 
in revenue and the independent variables such as incoming CEO’s age, school tier, level 
of education (degree), and prior experience. As the Pearson correlations matrix shows, 
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prior experience, 0.076, correlates more closely with a change in revenue than with the 
other independent variables.  
 In this model the coefficient of determination, R2, is only 0.011, which says that 
there is little way of prediction by the independent variables of age, level of education, 
and prior experience for the dependent variable, the change in revenue. 
Since the F-ratio is 0.275, giving α a value of 0.948, which is greater than the 5 percent critical 
level, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
 Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1. 
 There is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the 
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. 
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in stock price and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new 
CEOs. 
Appendix D shows the output of the model Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 
(Incoming CEO’s age) +β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є. 
The data suggest that undergraduate school tier has a higher negative correlation with the 
change in stock price. This is followed by data showing incoming CEO’s age, level of 
degree, and prior experience. The value of R2, 0.041, is higher than 0.011 in the previous 
model. So change in stock price is a better predictor with four independent variables than 
change in revenue. CEOs are more concerned with the change of stock price which 
reflects the value of the firm. 
 
           Only the null hypothesis of the schools in tiers 3 or 4 coded as “-1” is rejected. The 
α level is 0.047 which is less than 0.05, which means there is a significant correlation 
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between the change in stock price and the CEOs having graduated from a school in tier 3 
or 4 which is not good private or public school. This is the result of simple correlation 
between change in stock price and schools in tiers 3 or 4. 
 The F-ratio equals 1.047, giving α value of 0.397, which is greater than the 5 percent 
critical level, and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2. 
 There is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the 
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. There is, 
however, a significant correlation between the change in stock price and school tier 3 or 
4. 
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for 
new CEOs. 
As Appendix E shows, there is some correlation between the change in return on 
equity and the variables of age, 0.171, and prior experience, -0.134. The correlation 
between the variables of level of education and school tier and the change in return on 
equity is much lower. The value of R2, 0.204, is more predictable than the previous two 
instances of R2, 0.01 and 0.04 respectively. Since the value of the F-ratio equals 6.047, 
giving α value of 0, which is less than at the critical level of 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
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Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3. 
 
 There is a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and the 
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.   
Research Hypothesis 3 
 
Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium, or large based 
on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and tenure, and the 
change in the company’s performance?  
Specific hypotheses 
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the 
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the 
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.   
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and 
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure. 
Method 
The following models were used for insider and outsider separately. 
• Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)  
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є 
• Yt (Change in stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)  
  + β7 (Tenure) + Є 
• Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5 (Firm Size)+ β6 (Insider/Outsider) +  
β7 (Tenure) + Є  
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Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in revenue and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.   
Appendix F shows the result of the model Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm 
Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є. The value of R2, 0.224, has improved 
significantly when compared to the previous model in research hypothesis 2. As the 
correlation matrix shows, there is greater predictability between change in revenue and a 
firm’s size and tenure.   
Since the value of the F-ratio equals 6.435, giving α a value of 0.0001, which is 
less than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1. 
 
 There is a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the variables 
of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in stock price and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.   
Appendix G shows the result of the multiple regression model Yt (Change in 
stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є. The value of R2 is 
0.185. Since the value of the F-ratio equals 3.235, giving α value of 0.018, which is less 
than at the critical level of 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. Apart from the adjusted 
tenure, there is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the 
variables of firm size and the new CEO’s origin. Tenure is one of the most important 
factors affecting the stock price, the value of the firm. That is to say, the volatility of 
stock price is closely related with the CEO’s tenure. 
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Since the value of the F-ratio equals 3.235, giving α a value of 0.018, which is less than 
the 5 percent critical level, the null hypothesis is rejected  
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2. 
 There is a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the 
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change 
in return on equity and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure 
Appendix H shows the result of the model Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5 
(Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є in research hypothesis 3. The value 
of R2 is 0.173. The value of the F-ratio equals 2.930, giving α a value of 0.029, which is 
less than the 5 percent critical level, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3. 
 
 There is a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and the 
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
Research Hypothesis 4 
 
      Is there a difference in demographic independent factors (particularly in age, level 
of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance companies and their 
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies? 
Specific hypotheses 
1. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of 
age, among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both 
other financial institutions and IT companies. 
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2. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of 
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their 
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
3. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of 
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both 
other financial institutions and IT companies. 
Method 
 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was used to compare the means of 
each independent nominal variable such as age, education level, and tenure among CEOs 
of insurance companies and their counterparts at other financial institutions and IT 
companies. ANOVA is simply an extension of the t-test. ANOVA calculates an F 
statistic or F ratio.  
 
where RSSi is the residual sum of squares of model i. F here is distributed as an F-
distribution, with (p2 − p1, n − p2) degrees of freedom. 
Analysis of Variance can be used when the following assumptions are met: 
• The data are continuous (not discrete). 
• The data follow the normal probability distribution. Each group is 
normally distributed  about the group mean. 
• The variances of the populations are equal. 
• The groups are independent. There is no relationship among the 
individuals in one group as compared to another. 
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• Each group is a simple random sample from its population. Each 
individual in the population has an equal probability of being selected 
in the sample. 
     Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent 
demographic factor of age, among new CEOs of insurance companies and their 
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
Here the value of the F-ratio equals 7.66, giving α a value of 0.001 (see Appendix I), 
which is less than the 5 % critical level. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1. 
 
 There is a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of age 
between both new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at other financial 
institutions, and IT companies. 
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent 
demographic factor of level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and 
their counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
 Since the value of F-ratio equals 1.73, giving α value of 0.179 (see Appendix J), 
which is greater than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is accepted.  
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2. 
 
 There is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of 
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at 
both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
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Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent 
demographic factor of tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their 
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies. 
Since the value of the F-ratio equals 1.49, giving α a value of 0.227 (see 
Appendix K) which is greater than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is accepted.  
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3. 
 
 There is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of 
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other 
financial institutions and IT companies. 
Summary 
 
 Research hypothesis 1. The findings indicate that there is indeed a significant 
difference in a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. However, the findings also indicate that there is little or no 
difference in education level.  
Research hypothesis 2. The findings show that there is not a significant 
correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree and prior experiences, and a 
company’s change in revenue. There is also no significant correlation between the above 
demographic factors and the change in stock price. 
 There is, however, a significant correlation between the change in stock price and 
a new CEO who graduated from school tier three or four. There is also a significant 
correlation between the change in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, 
degree, and prior experience.   
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 Research hypothesis 3. The findings indicate that there is a significant correlation 
between changes in revenue, changes in stock price, and changes in return on equity and 
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.  
 Research hypothesis 4. The findings show that there is a significant difference in 
the independent demographic factor of age among new CEOs of insurance companies 
and their counterparts at other types of financial institutions or their counterparts at IT 
companies. However, there is no significant difference in the level of education or tenure. 
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Chapter 5–Major Findings and Conclusions, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
           This chapter provides an overall summary of the dissertation. The problem  
 
statement, the purpose of the study, literature review, and the methodology used to find  
 
the results to the research questions are addressed again. Finally, the summary of the  
 
major research findings from the data are presented with the recommendation of further  
 
studies. 
 
Major Findings and Conclusions 
 
  The research findings of this study were presented in Chapter 4. Statistical and 
descriptive procedures for the research questions were delineated along with findings. 
From these findings we drew the conclusions described below.   
 Research hypothesis 1 looked at whether or not there was a significant difference 
between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education level, and tenure before and after 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. The findings indicate that there was indeed a 
significant difference in a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. However, the findings also indicate that there is 
little or no difference in education level.  
 Appendix I shows that there is an increase of approximately three years in the 
average age of new CEOs following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly 
older than the average age of new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation, 
previous CEOs’ offspring and relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated 
firms were less complex and easier to manage (Joos, et al., 2003). 
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It is also interesting to note that, according to the demographic data, when 
incumbent CEOs are replaced from within a company that the successor is always 
younger. Only when a company is hiring from the outside, after an internal 
scandal for example, do they tend to select someone older. This was an altogether 
unexpected finding.  
 In regards to education levels, even though there is not a significant 
difference at the critical level, CEOs who have been hired after 1999 have a 
higher percentage of master’s degrees. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
average level of higher education among incoming CEOs post 1999 is higher than 
in years prior.  
The three specific hypotheses in research hypothesis 2 looked at whether there is 
a significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, education level, and prior 
experiences, and the company’s performance. The findings show that there is not a 
significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree and prior 
experiences, and a company’s change in revenue. There is also no significant correlation 
between the above demographic factors and the change in stock price. There is, however, 
a significant correlation between the change in stock price and a new CEO who graduated 
from school tier three or four. There is also a significant correlation between the change 
in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience.   
 The three specific hypotheses in research hypothesis 3 were used to determine if 
there is a significant correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium, or large 
based on annual revenue), the CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and tenure, and the 
company’s performance. First, there is a significant correlation between the change in 
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revenue and the variables of firm size, the CEO’s origin, and tenure. Second, there is a 
significant correlation between the change in stock price and the variables of firm size, 
the CEO’s origin, and tenure. Third, there is a significant correlation between the change 
in return on equity and the variables of firm size, the CEO’s origin, and tenure. 
 As per the results of research hypotheses 2 and 3, the new CEOs try to maximize 
the stockholder’s wealth through the change of return on equity. At the same time, the 
size of the firm, the CEO’s origin, and tenure are more significantly correlated with the 
company’s performance than a new CEO’s age, education level, and prior experiences. 
Tenure and the size of the firm are especially important factors in predicting the future 
company’s performance. 
 The last research hypothesis tested whether there is a significant difference in 
independent demographic factors such as age, level of education, and tenure among 
CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions 
and IT companies. The findings show that there is a significant difference in the 
independent demographic factor of age between new CEOs of insurance companies and 
their counterparts at other types of financial institutions and IT companies. However, 
there is no significant difference in the level of education or tenure. 
 These results show that there is difference in age because of industry 
characteristics, but the factors such as level of education and tenure are not big 
differences among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at other 
types of financial institutions or their counterparts at IT companies. 
Finally, after removing underperformed CEO’s data so as to determine the 
successful CEO’s demographic factors, we can conclude that the outperformed CEO is 
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slightly above 48 years old, and would be slightly older if we removed the founders of 
companies and their offspring. In addition, the successful CEO is more often an insider 
with previous COO title and a graduate from school tiers 1 and 2 with preferably a master 
degree. This finding applies to firm size above 700th rank. Finally, the ideal tenure for a 
CEO is between 10 and 12 years. Three multiple regression models are given in the 
appendix , each giving a detailed descriptive summary and the output of multiple 
regression for outperformed CEOs.  
        Given these findings, when a Board of Directors selects a new CEO they must give 
the above demographic factors priority if all other factors are equal, though these 
demographic factors may vary between industries. For example, until December 9, 2009, 
Bank of America’s Board (Carney, 2009) still could not  find the right CEO. The bank 
was considering both inside and outside candidates to succeed the incumbent CEO, Ken 
Lewis. In this situation, the bank’s fist course of action could be to apply my multiple 
regression formula in order to better evaluate several candidates. 
 Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) + 
 β3(Degree) + β4 (Prior experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + 
 β7 (Tenure) + Є 
Estimated Model 
 
Yt (Change in Revenue)= -28569.30+ 586.12*Age+ 10865.22*(Education Level=0)-
10754.31*(Firm Size=-1)-11818.34*(Firm Size=0)-4071.79*(O=0)-1793.70*(Prior 
Exp=-1)+ 7860.67*(School Tier=-1)+ 2635.33*(School Tier=0)+ 972.71*Tenure 
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To illustrate how this formula would work, let us assume that Bank of 
America’s board has two candidates and that the candidates’ demographic factors 
are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Demographics of Imaginary Bank of America CEO Candidates 
                                        Candidate A                       Candidate B 
Age 49 52 
School Tier 2 1 
Degree MBA BA 
Prior Experience COO CFO 
Insider/Outsider Insider Outsider 
Expected Tenure 9 9 
 
    Because we already know the size of the firm (1), we do not need to include 
this factor in the formula. When we plug in the above candidate’s demographic 
factors into the Estimated Model 1 above, the change in revenue ($mil) after the 
selection of candidate A is 22,405.53. In contrast, for candidate B, the change in 
revenue is 4,797.84. Therefore Candidate A should be given greater 
consideration.  
 On December 16, Bank of America’s board of directors chose consumer 
banking chief Brian Moynihan, 50, to replace Ken Lewis as CEO on January 1, 
2010 (Brandon, 2009). Dr. Walter E. Massey, chairman of Bank of America, who 
led the CEO search, said “Brian’s wide range of experience, his relationship 
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inside and outside of the company, and his demonstrated ability to understand 
business dynamics and effect constructive change made him the best person for 
the position” (Brandon, 2009). The new CEO, Brian Moynihan, is a graduate of 
Brown University and the University of Notre Dame Law School. He faces 
regulatory investigations into the bank’s 2008 acquisition of Merrill Lynch.  
 As one can see, the above model is very practical and easy to apply when 
searching for a new CEO. However, this should be followed by a detailed 
interview asking candidates what course of action they would take based on the 
company’s current situation. 
This study examined the relationship between the financial performance of a 
company over time and specific demographic factors of the company’s CEO, 
including age, tenure, education and prior experience, as well as whether he/she 
was hired from within or outside the company. The goal is to establish a 
prediction model for companies to aid them in their selection of a new CEO. This 
prediction model is only applied to the financial industries in selecting a new 
CEO. This model also supports Hogan and Kaiser’s leadership definition that 
leadership should be defined in terms of the ability to build and maintain a group 
that performs well compared to its competition and be evaluated in terms of the 
performance of the group over time (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). At the same time, 
the model used to support the selection of a new CEO can be changed dependent 
upon the size of firms, tenure, age, and the types of firms whether regulated or 
unregulated (Joos, et al., 2003).  
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The average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly older than 
the average age of new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation, previous 
CEOs’ offspring and relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated 
firms are less complex and easier to manage. Finally the model supports Keiser’s 
claim that CEOs are becoming professionalized with higher degrees such as 
MBA, MS, MA, or JD because of the intellectual difficulty of the job and the 
extensive training required (Keiser, 2004). 
Recommendations 
 
 This study has focused on the CEOs of large, Fortune 1000 companies.  
However, in the real world, a company is not operated solely by the CEO, even 
though he or she plays a vital role in the company’s success. Newly appointed 
CEOs most often appoint their immediate followers or people they have known 
throughout their career, people who will assist them in accomplishing both their 
own personal goals and the company’s goals.  
 Therefore, further research should focus on the study of a CEO’s 
immediate followers, such as the CEOs of affiliate companies, or divisional 
heads, and the roles they play in a company’s success. By analyzing their personal 
traits or demographic factors we can study how the organizational framework and 
chemistry influence company performance as a whole.  
 During this present economic crisis, several companies which were listed 
in the Fortune 500 have collapsed or have been acquired by other competitors. If 
the current recession lasts much longer, many more companies will have gone 
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bankrupt. Therefore, there is more pressure than ever before for CEO’s and their 
immediate followers to steer there companies through this time of crisis. 
 Because there is a significant time gap between the period before 1999 and 
the period after, the study of tenure is limited. If a study is carried out in another 6 
years, the results should clarify the results of this study. 
 For the study of CEOs in the insurance industry, which consist of two 
types of companies, mutual and stock (Williams, 1987). For the purposes of this 
paper, CEOs of mutual companies have been excluded because a company’s stock 
performance cannot be studied. Therefore, further research is needed to 
understand the relationship between their changes in revenue and net income and 
the CEOs’ demographic factors. Because their stocks are not traded in the stock 
markets, there may be differences in demographic factors such as tenure, age, and 
level of education. In the execution of strategic planning, the CEOs of mutual 
companies might be more powerful than their counterparts in the stock 
companies, as they do not have to pay attention to their own daily stock 
movement and other factors related to stock movement. On the other hand, 
because there are no monitoring forces such as shareholders, they may be more 
resistant to both change and risk. Sometimes they might not notice that their own 
mistakes have resulted in poor planning and execution. If a CEO in a mutual 
company is not a good leader, the company’s future will be disastrous because 
there is no strong monitoring power like in a stock company. 
 Another area ripe for further study is the relationship between company’s 
debt ratio and the demographic factors of its CEO, such as age, education level 
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and prior experience. A company which has a high debt ratio needs a CEO who is 
able to endure high levels of stress and still perform well, or perhaps a more 
optimistic, sociable personality that can inspire others. 
 It would be interesting to study the hiring rates and performance of CEOs 
with only undergraduate degrees. There might be significant differences in their 
traits and their performance, depending on their major. In the Information 
Technology and Computer Software areas, several of the CEOs dropped out of 
school without receiving their bachelor degree. This would not be expected in 
other industries. Founding new companies in the financial industries, for example, 
is virtually impossible due to the huge of initial investment. Perhaps, future 
studies linking various educational backgrounds with success in specific 
industries might throw more light on the importance of education on a CEOs 
future success. In other words, the success of CEOs may not only depend on the 
amount of higher education, but on specific majors that best prepare them for 
success.  
 Because of non-numerical value, personality and leadership style were 
excluded in this research. However, if the personality and leadership style data 
can be obtained from the well designed questionnaire, we can add these data 
through encoding to our model. In that case the model would be far more robust. 
It would support Hogan and Kaiser’s (2005) argument. 
 Finally it would be interesting to study the relationship between the 
change in a company’s performance and other demographic factors. For example, 
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if the CEO’s compensation factors are added to the multiple regression estimated 
model, the results will likely be more robust.   
Summary 
 
 Because of new technologies as well as increased competition, from both within 
and outside the industry, CEOs must be able to sort through and analyze vast amounts of 
information. This requires considerable cognitive ability as well as higher education and 
training. Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure than ever before to act quickly, to 
recognize potential problems or opportunities and to take action immediately. For these 
and other reasons, companies are turning to “younger” CEOs with shorter tenure than 
incumbent CEOs, as they are more familiar with new technologies, better able to endure 
high stress environments, more open to new ideas and less reluctant to take necessary 
challenge.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Two-Sample Test Report for CEO’s Ages Pre and Post 1999 
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
  Standard      Standard 95% LCL        95% UCL 
Variable         Count Mean   Deviation       Error of Mean              of Mean 
Age pre- 1999     57 47.72    7.70              1.02 45.68 49.76 
Age post 1999     36 50.94       5.46              0.91 49.10 52.79 
Note: T-alpha (Age before GBL) = 2.0032,   T-alpha (Age after GBL) = 2.0301 
 
Equal-Variance T-Test Section 
 
Alternative Prob Decision Power Power 
Hypothesis            T-Value Level (5%) (Alpha=.05)   (Alpha=.01) 
Difference <> 0       -2.1883 0.031 Reject Ho 0.581 0.335 
Difference < 0         -2.1883 0.016 Reject Ho 0.701 0.432 
Difference > 0         -2.1883 0.984 Accept Ho 0.000 0.000 
Difference: (Age before GBL)-(Age after GBL) 
  
Median Statistics 
   95% LCL 95% UCL 
Variable Count Median of Mean of Mean 
Age before GBL 57 49 47 51 
Age after GBL 36 50.5 49 53 
 
Plots Section 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Two-Sample Test Report for CEO’s Adjusted Tenure Pre and Post GBL (1999) 
 
          Standard  Standard  95% LCL 95% UCL  Variable  
Tenure after GBL   58     5.569          2.933        0.385   4.798            6.340 
Tenure before GBL  119   14.958       10.126        0.928 13.120          16.796 
Note: T-alpha (Tenure after GBL) = 2.0025,   T-alpha (Tenure before GBL) = 1.9803 
Confidence-Limits of Difference Section 
 
 
Variance  Mean     Standard   Standard 95% LCL      95% UCL 
Assumption DF   Difference  Deviation      Error of Mean         of Mean 
Equal 175   -9.389          8.482          1.358 -12.070          -6.708 
Unequal                    152.74   -9.389         10.542          1.005 -11.374 -7.404 
Note: T-alpha (Equal) = 1.9736,   T-alpha (Unequal) = 1.9756 
 
 
Equal-Variance T-Test Section 
 
Alternative                     Prob       Decision Power               Power 
Hypothesis T-Value       Level        (5%) (Alpha=.05)  (Alpha=.01) 
Difference <> 0 -6.913         0.000     Reject Ho 1.000                 0.999990 
Difference: (Tenure_afterGBL)-(Tenure_beforeGBL) 
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APPENDIX C 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two  
Specific Hypothesis (1) 
Pearson Correlations Section  
 
 Age              Prior Exp        School Tier Change in Revenue      Degree 
Age 1.000              -0.040             -0.172 -0.002                       0.157 
Prior Exp -0.040               1.000             -0.142 0.076                       0.033 
School tier -0.172              -0.142              1.000 -0.026                     -0.122 
Change in Revenue -0.002               0.076             -0.026 1.000                     -0.030 
Degree 0.157               0.033             -0.122 -0.030                      1.000 
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.000004       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.150887 
Run Summary Section 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Dependent Variable Change in Revenue Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables 6 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 141 
R2 0.011 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
                                                                 
   
Adj R2 0.000 Rows with Y Missing 12 
Coefficient of Variation 2.070 Rows Used in Estimation 154 
Mean Square Error 2.865949E+08 Sum of Weights 154 
                                                        
 Square Root of MSE 16929.12 Completion Status   Normal Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 3016.032   
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 Age 154 49.130 7.494 23 66 
(Degree=0) 
 154 0.623 0.486 0 1 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 154 1.948052E-02 0.139 0 1 
(Prior Exp=0) 
 154 2.597403E-02 0.160 0 1 
(School tier=-1) 
 154 0.227 0.420 0 1 
(School tier=0) 
 154 0.299 0.459 0 1 
Change in Revenue 
 154 8180.361 16686.65 -5100 96206 
Estimated Model 
 
6697.868 + 8.773*Age + 1293.647*(Degree=0) -5330.492*(Prior Exp=-1)-7912.504*(Prior Exp=0) +    294.075*(School tier=-1) + 
1632.307*(School tier=0) 
 
Regression Equation Section 
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject  
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at  
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%?  
Intercept 6697.868 9642.558 0.695 0.488 No  
Age 8.773 187.704 0.047 0.963 No  
(Degree=0) 
 1293.647 2866.792 0.451 0.653 No  
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 -5330.492 9919.694 -0.537 0.592 No  
(Prior Exp =0) 
 -7912.504 8725.904 -0.907 0.366 No  
(School tier=-1) 
 294.075 3592.166 0.082 0.935 No  
(School tier=0) 
 1632.307 3251.765 0.502 0.616 No  
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Analysis of Variance Section 
   Sum of Mean          Prob  
Source DF R2 Squares Square F-Ratio Level  
Intercept 1  1.030542E+10 1.030542E+10 
Model 6 0.011 4.725222E+08 7.87537E+07 0.275 0.948  
Error 147 0.989 4.212946E+10 2.865949E+08 
Total(Adjusted) 153 1.000 4.260198E+10 2.784443E+08 
 
Analysis of Variance  
Model  Sum of Mean  Prob Power 
Term                               DF             R2         Squares Square F-Ratio Level (5%) 
Intercept 1  1.030542E+10 1.030542E+10 
Model 6 0.011 4.725222E+08 7.87537E+07 0.275 0.948  
Age 1 0.000 626065.1 626065.1 0.002 0.963  
Degree 1 0.001 5.835898E+07 5.835898E+07 0.204 0.653  
Prior Exp 
 2 0.007 3.088295E+08 1.544148E+08 0.539 0.585  
School tier 
 2 0.002 7.62998E+07 3.81499E+07 0.133 0.876  
Error 147 0.989 4.212946E+10 2.865949E+08 
Total(Adjusted) 153 1.000 4.260198E+10 2.784443E+08 
           
 
PRESS Section 
 From From 
 PRESS Regular 
Parameter Residuals Residuals 
Sum of Squared Residuals 4.520033E+10 4.212946E+10 
Sum of |Residuals| 1602749 1543773 
R2 0.0000 0.0111 
Normality Tests Section 
Test Test Prob Reject H0 
Name Value Level At Alpha = 20%? 
Shapiro Wilk 0.5761 0.000000 Yes 
Anderson Darling 22.9095 0.000000 Yes 
D'Agostino Skewness 9.1851 0.000000 Yes 
D'Agostino Kurtosis 6.3418 0.000000 Yes 
D'Agostino Omnibus 124.5836 0.000000 Yes 
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APPENDIX D 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two  
Specific Hypothesis (2) 
 
Pearson Correlations Section    (Row-Wise Deletion) 
  Age       Prior Exp    School Tier Change in S     Degree  
Age  1.000        -0.041          -0.174         -0.100 0.159 
Prior Exp  -0.041         1.000          -0.141          0.017 0.031 
School Tier    -0.174        -0.141           1.000         -0.125 -0.127 
Change in Stock Price -0.100         0.017          -0.125          1.000 -0.063 
Degree  0.159         0.031          -0.127         -0.063 1.000 
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.000267       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.363045 
 
 
Parameter Value Parameter
 Value 
Dependent Variable Change in Stock Price Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables 6 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 141 
R2 0.041 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2 0.002 Rows with Y Missing 11 
Coefficient of Variation 11.9402 Rows Used in Estimation 155 
Mean Square Error 6.669676E+07 Sum of Weights
 155.000 
Square Root of MSE 8166.809 Completion Status
 Normal Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 62054.263   
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum   Maximum 
Age 155 49.110 7.474 23 66 
(Degree=0) 
 155 0.626 0.485 0 1 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 155 1.935484E-02 0.138 0 1 
(Prior Exp =0) 
 155 2.580645E-02 0.159 0 1 
(School tier=-1) 
 155 0.226 0.419 0    
     
(School tier =0) 
 155 0.297 0.458 0 1 
Change in Stock Price 
 155 683.979 8174.287 -20.85 101790 
           
 
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject Power 
 
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept 5344.154 4650.190 1.149 0.252 No 0.208 
Age -126.373 90.545 -1.396 0.165 No 0.284 
(Degree=0) 
 1042.520 1381.172 0.755 0.452 No 0.117 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 315.649 4784.728 0.066 0.948 No 0.051 
(Prior Exp =0) 
 200.824 4207.705 0.048 0.962 No 0.050 
(School tier=-1) 
 3461.820 1729.618 2.001 0.047 Yes 0.511 
(School tier =0) 
 338.820 1564.877 0.217 0.829 No 0.055 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two 
Specific Hypothesis (3) 
 
  Pearson Correlations Section    
 Age          Prior Exp       School Tier     Change in ROE     Degree  
Age 1.000           -0.039             -0.174  0.171 0.147 
Prior Exp -0.039            1.000             -0.147  -0.134 0.030 
School tier -0.174          -0.147                1.000 -0.013 -0.119 
Change in ROE 0.171          -0.134               -0.013 1.000 0.049 
Degree 0.147           0.030               -0.119 0.049 1.000 
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.091152       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.126015 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Dependent Variable               Change in ROE  Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables           6  Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable                     None Rows with X's Missing 141 
R2                                           0.204 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2                                    0.170 Rows with Y Missing 17 
Coefficient of Variation         8.3790 Rows Used in Estimation 149 
Mean Square Error                700.642 Sum of Weights 149.000 
Square Root of MSE             26.470 Completion Status Normal Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error  359.644   
   Standard 
Variable                         Count  Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Age 149 49.215 7.430 23 66 
(Degree =0) 
 149 0.631 0.484 0 1 
(Prior Exp =-1) 
 149 2.013423E-02 0.141 0 1 
(Prior Exp =0) 
 149 2.684564E-02 0.162 0 1 
(School tier =-1) 
 149 0.235 0.425 0 1 
(School tier =0) 
 149 0.295 0.458 0 1 
Change in ROE 149 3.159 29.052 -52 297.9 
 
 
 
      
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject Power 
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept -28.374 15.425 -1.839 0.068 No 0.447 
App 0.594 0.301 1.975 0.050 No 0.501 
(Degree =0) 
 -2.286 4.566 -0.501 0.618 No 0.079 
(Prior Exp =-1) 
 -14.976 15.519 -0.965 0.336 No 0.160 
(Prior Exp =0) 
 73.995 13.661 5.416 0.000 Yes 0.100 
(School tier =-1) 
 2.044 5.664 0.361 0.719 No 0.065 
(School tier =0) 
 5.359 5.197 1.031 0.304 No 0.176 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three 
Specific Hypothesis (1) 
 
Pearson Correlations Section    
                                       Tenure          Origin       Change in Revenue     Ranking of Firm  
Tenure                               1.000            0.145               0.219                          -0.079 
Origin                                 0.145            1.000               0.072                           0.146 
Change in Revenue           0.219            0.072               1.000                           0.360 
Ranking of Firm                 -0.079           0.146               0.360                           1.000  
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.000423       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.402325 
 
Run Summary Section 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Dependent Variable Change in Revenue Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables 4 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 213 
R2 0.224 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2 0.190 Rows with Y Missing 0 
Coefficient of Variation 1.922 Rows Used in Estimation 94 
Mean Square Error 1.600888E+08 Sum of Weights 94.000 
Square Root of MSE 12652.62 Completion Status Normal 
Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 773.246   
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
(Outsider =0) 94 0.128 0.335 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 94 0.234 0.426 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 94 0.309 0.464 0 1 
Tenure 94 9.798 8.728 1 45 
Change in Revenue 
 94 6582.394 14054 -3554 96206 
 
 
            
 
Regression Equation Section 
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject Power 
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept 8912.119 2429.293 3.669 0.0004 Yes 0.952 
(Outsider =0) -782.007 4093.475 -0.191 0.8489 No 0.054 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 -11980.405 3389.051 -3.535 0.0006 Yes 0.938 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 -11697.168 3077.973 -3.800 0.0003 Yes 0.964 
Tenure 426.902 153.096 2.788 0.0065 Yes 0.788 
Estimated Model 
 8912.119 -782.007*(Outsider =0)-11980.404*(Ranking of Firm=-1)-11697.168*(Ranking of Firm=0)+ 
426.902*Tenure 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three 
Specific Hypothesis (2) 
 
Pearson Correlations Section    (Row-Wise Deletion) 
 
  Origin CiS       Ranking of Firm    Adjusted tenure 
Origin  1.000 0.038 0.266 0.111 
Change in Stock Price 0.038 1.000 0.137 0.367 
Ranking of Firm  0.266 0.137 1.000 -0.083 
Adjusted tenure  0.111 0.367 -0.083 1.000 
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.000753       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.392506 
 
Run Summary Section 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Dependent Variable Change in Stock Price Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables 4 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 245 
R2 0.185 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2 0.128 Rows with Y Missing 0 
Coefficient of Variation 7.1821 Rows Used in Estimation 62 
Mean Square Error 1.456433E+08 Sum of Weights 62.000 
Square Root of MSE 12068.28 Completion Status Normal Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 49889.506   
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
  Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Adjusted tenure 6211.75806 9.613319 1 45 
(Outsider =0) 628.064516E-02 0.2745122 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 62 0.2741936 0.4497488 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 62 0.3225806 0.4712799 0 1 
Change in Stock Price 
 62 1680.338 12922.52 -0.47 101790 
 
 Regression Equation Section 
  Regression Standard T-Value Reject Power 
Independent Coefficient  Errorto test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i)  Sb(i)H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept -1392.42642935.6116-0.474 0.6371 No 0.0753 
Adjusted tenure 552.6524164.98413.350 0.0014 Yes 0.9087 
(Outsider =0) 932.58796048.51330.154 0.8780 No 0.0526 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 -5047.8710 3987.8632-1.2660.2107 No 0.2378 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 -6561.0666 3701.2865-1.7730.0816 No 0.4141 
 
Estimated Model 
-1392.426+ 552.652*Adjusted tenure+ 932.588*(Outsider =0)-5047.871*(Ranking of Firm=-1)-6561.067*(Ranking 
of Firm=0) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three 
Specific Hypothesis (3) 
 
Pearson Correlations Section    (Row-Wise Deletion) 
 Origin CiROE         Ranking of Firm    Adjusted tenure 
Origin 1.000 -0.317 0.277 0.106 
Change in ROE -0.317 1.000 0.094 -0.045 
Ranking of Firm 0.277 0.094 1.000 -0.060 
Adjusted tenure 0.106 -0.045 -0.060 1.000 
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.065700       Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.035346 
 
Run Summary Section 
Parameter Value Parameter
 Value 
Dependent Variable Change in ROE Rows Processed 307 
Number Ind. Variables 4 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 245 
R2 0.173 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2 0.114 Rows with Y Missing 1 
Coefficient of Variation 10.9946 Rows Used in Estimation 61 
Mean Square Error 107.7824 Sum of Weights
 61.000 
Square Root of MSE 10.38183 Completion Status
 Normal Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 204.459   
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Adjusted tenure 61 11.59016 9.601002 1 45 
(Outsider =0) 61 8.196721E-02 0.2765913 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 61 0.2622951 0.4435328 0 1 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 61 0.3278688 0.4733326 0 1 
Change in ROE 61 0.9442623 11.02966 -31.8 32.4 
 
 
Regression Equation Section 
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject Power 
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept 1.1166 2.5314 0.441 0.6608 No 0.0718 
Adjusted tenure -0.0329 0.1433 -0.230 0.8192 No 0.0559 
(Outsider =0) 16.8127 5.2340 3.212 0.0022 Yes 0.8843 
(Ranking of Firm=-1) 
 -6.3743 3.5057 -1.818 0.0744 No 0.4315 
(Ranking of Firm=0) 
 1.5339 3.1861 0.481 0.6321 No 0.0760 
 
Estimated Model 
 1.117 -3.291E-02*Adjusted tenure+ 16.813*(Outsider =0)-6.374*(Ranking of Firm=-1)+ 1.534*(Ranking of Firm=0) 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Analysis of Variance Report for Age 
 
Expected Mean Squares Section 
Source  Term Denominator Expected 
Term DF Fixed? Term Mean Square 
A ( ... ) 2 Yes S(A) S+sA 
S(A) 250 No  S(A) 
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case. 
 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source  Sum of Mean  Prob Power 
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05) 
A ( ... ) 2 1003.697 501.8483 7.66 0.001 0.945992 
S(A) 250 16373.89 65.49557 
Total (Adjusted) 252 17377.59 
Total 253 
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05      
  
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
Ho: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 2 14.44103 0.000731 Reject 
Ho 
Corrected for Ties 2 14.46785 0.000722 Reject 
Ho 
 
Number Sets of Ties 30 
Multiplicity Factor 30024 
 
Group Detail 
  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
IT Age 50 4590.00 91.80 -3.7971 45 
Ins Age 100 13488.00 134.88 1.3847 50 
OFC Age 103 14053.00 136.44 1.6997 51 
 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 253 48.58  47.90262 
A: 
IT Age 50 44.58 1.144514 -3.322621 
Ins Age 100 49.39 0.8092933 1.487379 
OFC Age 103 49.74 0.7974204
 1.835243 
 
 
                Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test 
 
Response: IT Age, Ins Age, OFC Age 
Term A:  
Alpha=0.050  Error Term=S(A)  DF=250  MSE=65.49557 
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   Different From 
 
Group Count Mean Groups 
IT Age 50 44.58 Ins Age, OFC Age 
Ins Age 100 49.39 IT Age 
OFC Age 103 49.74 IT Age 
 
Notes:  
This report provides multiple comparison tests for all pairwise differences between 
the means. According to Hsu(1996, page 130), the specified family-wise error rate (alpha)  
is overstated and the Tukey-Kramer method is recommended instead. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test 
 
Variable IT Age Ins Age OFC Age 
IT Age 0.0000 3.4020 3.5422 
Ins Age 3.4020 0.0000 0.1517 
OFC Age 3.5422 0.1517 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 2.3940 
 
Box Plot Section 
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Plots of Means Section 
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APPENDIX J 
 
Analysis of Variance Report for Level of Education 
 
Expected Mean Squares Section 
Source  Term Denominator Expected 
Term DF Fixed? Term Mean Square 
A ( ... ) 2 Yes S(A) S+sA 
S(A) 228 No  S(A) 
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case. 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source  Sum of Mean  Prob
 Power 
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
 (Alpha=0.05) 
A ( ... ) 2 0.8193162 0.4096581 1.73 0.179
 0.361562 
S(A) 228 53.89064 0.2363625 
Total (Adjusted) 230 54.70996 
Total 231 
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05       
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
Ho: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level
 Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 2 2.447354 0.294147 Accept 
Ho 
Corrected for Ties 2 3.444396 0.178673 Accept 
Ho 
 
Number Sets of Ties 2 
Multiplicity Factor 3568026 
 
Group Detail 
  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
IT Edu Level 86 10191.50 118.51 0.4389 0 
Ins Edu Level 99 10774.50 108.83 -1.4115 0 
OFC Edu Level 46 5830.00 126.74 1.2179 0 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error
 Effect 
All 231 0.39 
 0.4028233 
A: 
IT Edu Level 86 0.41 5.242519E-02
 4.153432E-03 
Ins Edu Level 99 0.32 4.886205E-02 -
7.959099E-02 
OFC Edu Level 46 0.48 7.168204E-02
 7.5437 
 
Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test 
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Response: IT Edu Level, Ins Edu Level, OFC Edu Level 
Term A:  
 
Alpha=0.050  Error Term=S(A)  DF=228  MSE=0.2363625 
 
 
    
 
   Different From 
 
Group Count Mean Groups 
IT Edu Level 99 0.41  
Ins Edu Level 86 0.32  
OFC Edu Level 46 0.48  
 
 Comparison   
Group Coefficient Count Mean 
IT Edu Level -3 86 0.4069767 
Ins Edu Level 1 99 0.3232323 
OFC Edu Level 1 46 0.4782609 
 
Box Plot Section 
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 Plots of Means Section 
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APPENDIX K 
 
Analysis of Variance Report for Tenure 
 
Expected Mean Squares Section 
Source  Term Denominator Expected 
Term DF Fixed? Term Mean Square 
A ( ... ) 2 Yes S(A) S+sA 
S(A) 249 No  S(A) 
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case. 
 
                Analysis of Variance Table 
 
Source  Sum of Mean  Prob
 Power 
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
 (Alpha=0.05) 
A ( ... ) 2 246.1834 123.0917 1.49 0.227
 0.316498 
S(A) 249 20548.5 82.52408 
Total (Adjusted) 251 20794.68 
Total 252 
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05 
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
Ho: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level
 Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 2 1.72557 0.421985 Accept 
Ho 
Corrected for Ties 2 1.732566 0.420512 Accept 
Ho 
 
Number Sets of Ties 26 
Multiplicity Factor 64620 
 
Group Detail 
  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
IT Tenure 99 13179.00 133.12 1.1600 8 
Ins Tenure 103 12327.50 119.68 -1.2341 7 
OFC Tenure 50 6371.50 127.43 0.1008 8.5 
 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error
 Effect 
All 252 10.96429 
 10.97141 
A: 
IT Tenure 99 12.10101 0.9130041
 1.129605 
Ins Tenure 103 9.893204 0.8951004 -
1.078201 
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OFC Tenure 50 10.92 1.284711
 5.140466E-02 
 Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test 
 
Term A:  
Alpha=0.050  Error Term=S(A)  DF=249  MSE=82.52408 
 
    
 
 
   Different From 
 
                Group Count Mean Groups 
IT Tenure 103   9.89  
Ins Tenure 50 10.92  
OFC Tenure 99 12.10 
 
Plots of Means Section 
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Box Plot Section 
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Notes:  
This report provides multiple comparison tests for all pairwise differences between 
the means. According to Hsu(1996, page 130), the specified family-wise error rate (alpha)  
is overstated and the Tukey-Kramer method is recommended instead. 
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APPENDIX L  
 
Output of Multiple Regression for Outperformed CEOs 
 
The following is the multiple regression for outperformed CEOs in order to 
determine their general demographic characteristics. Here outperformed means that the 
percentage of change in revenue is greater than the percentage of change in the S & P 500 
index during the same period.   
 Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) +  
 β3(Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)  
 + β7 (Tenure) + Є 
From the result, we can now conclude that the average age of the outperformed 
CEO is approximately 49 years old, and he/she is an insider with previous COO title and 
graduated from school tier 1 and 2 with preferably a master degree. This result applies to 
firm size above 700th rank. The ideal tenure for CEO is between 10 and 12 years. 
One interesting finding is that more CEOs have only undergraduate degrees than any 
other degrees.
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Summary Section of Age 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Range 
146 48.81 7.989921 0.6612505 20 66 46 
 
Counts Section of Age 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total
 Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares
 Sum Squares 
303 146 157 33 7126 357064 9256.63 
 
Means Section of Age 
   Geometric Harmonic 
Parameter Mean Median Mean Mean Sum Mode 
Value 48.80822 50 48.0558 47.15127 7126 51 
Std Error 0.6612505    96.54258  
95% LCL 47.50129 48   6935.188  
95% UCL 50.11515 51   7316.813  
T-Value  73.8120 
Prob Level 0.000000 
Count 146  146 146  12 
 
 Variation Section of Age 
  Standard Unbiased Std Error Interquartile 
Parameter Variance Deviation Std Dev of Mean Range    Range     
 
Value 63.83883 7.989921 8.003708 0.6612505 10 46 
Std Error 9.220871 0.8160458  6.753643E-02 
95% LCL 51.36035 7.166613  0.5931131 
95% UCL 81.5162 9.028632  0.7472149 
 
Mean-Deviation Section of Age 
Parameter |X-Mean| |X-Median| (X-Mean)^2 (X-Mean)^3 (X-Mean)^4 
Average 6.24545 6.136986 63.40158 -393.4879 16263.87 
Std Error 0.3984393  9.157715 170.1796 5543.633 
 
  
            
Quartile Section of Age 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Parameter Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Value 39 44 50 54 58 
95% LCL 34 42 48 53 56 
95% UCL 41 45 51 56 60 
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  Plots Section of Age 
 
0.0
12.5
25.0
37.5
50.0
20.0 32.5 45.0 57.5 70.0
Histogram of Agex
Agex
Co
un
t
   
 
Summary Section of I/O 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Range 
112 0.9107143 0.2864373 2.706578E-02 0 1 1 
 
Counts Section of I/O 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total
 Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares
 Sum Squares 
303 112 191 2 102 102  
 
Plots Section of I_O 
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Percentile Section of I_O 
 
 
Summary Section of Prior Experience 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum    Range 
104 0.9423077 0.3061481 3.002029E-02 -1 1               2 
 
Counts Section of Prior Experience  
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total             Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares           
303 104 199 3 98 102                   9 
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Summary Section of School Tier 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation ErrorMinimum Maximum Range 
105 0.1809524 0.8178414 7.981315E-02 -1 1 2 
 
 
 
Counts Section of School Tier 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares Sum Squares 
303 105 198 3 19 73 69.5619 
    
Quartile Section of School Tier 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Parameter Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Value -1 -1 0 1 1 
95% LCL -1 -1 0 1 1 
95% UCL -1 0 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Plots Section of School Tier 
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Summary Section of Education Level 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum     Range 
65 0.6769231 0.4712912 5.845648E-02 0                             1                   1 
 
 
Counts Section of Education Level 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares Sum Squares 
303 65 238 2 44 44 14.21538 
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Plots Section of Education Level 
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Summary Section of Firm Size 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Range 
60 0.1833333 0.8334463 0.1075975 -1 1 2 
 
 
 
Counts Section of Firm Size 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares Sum Squares 
303 60 243 3 11 43 40.98333 
 
     
 
 
 
Plots Section of Firm Size 
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Summary Section of Tenure 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum     Range 
111 11.73 9.999042 0.9490671 1                            45                   44 
 
 
Counts Section of Tenure 
 Sum of Missing Distinct  Total Adjusted 
Rows Frequencies Values Values Sum Sum Squares Sum Squares 
303 111 192 32 1302 26270 10997.89 
 
Means Section of Tenure 
   Geometric Harmonic 
Parameter Mean Median Mean Mean Sum Mode 
Value 11.72973 8 8.598675 6.26896 1302 9 
Std Error 0.9490671    105.3464  
95% LCL 9.848902 7   1093.228  
95% UCL 13.61056 9   1510.772  
T-Value  12.3592 
Prob Level 0.000000 
Count 111  111 111  11 
 
Section of Tenure 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Parameter Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Value 3 5 8 15 27.4 
95% LCL 2 4 7 10 22 
95% UCL 4 6 9 22 36 
 
Plots Section of Tenure 
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Multiple Regression Report 
Run Summary Section 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Dependent Variable Change in Revenue(C6160) Rows Processed 303 
Number Ind. Variables 9 Rows Filtered Out 0 
Weight Variable None Rows with X's Missing 266 
R2 0.444 Rows with Weight Missing 0 
Adj R2 0.251 Rows with Y Missing 1 
Coefficient of Variation 1.4811 Rows Used in Estimation 36 
Mean Square Error 2.466152E+08 Sum of Weights 36.000 
Square Root of MSE 15703.99 Completion Status Normal 
Completion 
Ave Abs Pct Error 305.148   
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Age 36 47.61 7.979537 23 60 
(Education Level=0) 
 36 0.25 0.439155 0 1 
(Firm Size=-1) 36 0.25 0.439155 0 1 
(Firm Size=0) 36 0.1944444 0.4013865 0 1 
(I_O=0) 36 0.1388889 0.3507362 0 1 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 36 2.777778E-02 0.1666667 0 1 
(School Tier=-1) 
 36 0.2777778 0.4542568 0 1 
(School Tier=0) 
 36 0.1944444 0.4013865 0 1 
Tenure 36 11.77778 10.4036 2 42 
C6160 36 10603.21 18143.86 155 96206 
 
 
Regression Equation Section 
 Regression Standard T-Value  Reject Power 
Independent Coefficient Error to test  Prob H0 at of Test 
Variable b(i) Sb(i) H0:B(i)=0 Level 5%? at 5% 
Intercept -28569.3041 36588.7512 -0.781 0.4420 No 0.1169 
Age 586.1209 656.5067 0.893 0.3802 No 0.1381 
(Education Level=0) 
 10865.2235 7446.9538 1.459 0.1565 No 0.2900 
(Firm Size=-1) -10754.3086 11134.1122 -0.966 0.3430 No 0.1536 
(Firm Size=0) -11818.3370 8748.7420 -1.351 0.1884 No 0.2556 
(I_O=0) -4071.7898 11226.4033 -0.363 0.7198 No 0.0641 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 -1793.6966 19754.8905 -0.091 0.9283 No 0.0509 
(School Tier=-1) 
 7860.6687 6296.6154 1.248 0.2230 No 0.2252 
(School Tier=0) 
 2635.3303 8997.9331 0.293 0.7719 No 0.0592 
Tenure 972.7071 477.8034 2.036 0.0521 No 0.5002 
 
Estimated Model 
-28569.30+ 586.12*Age+ 10865.22*(Education Level=0)-10754.31*(Firm Size=-1)-11818.34*(Firm Size=0)-
4071.79*(I_O=0)-1793.70 
*(Prior_Exp=-1)+ 7860.67*(School_Tier=-1)+ 2635.33*(School_Tier=0)+ 972.71*Tenure 
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Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent Regression Standard       Lower      Upper   
Variable Coefficient Error 95% C.L. 95% C.L.  Coefficient 
Intercept -28569.3041 36588.7512 -103778.5593 46639.9511 0.0000 
Age 586.1209 656.5067 -763.3478 1935.5897 0.2578 
(Education Level=0) 
 10865.2235 7446.9538 -4442.2093 26172.6563 0.2630 
(Firm Size=-1) -10754.3086 11134.1122 -33640.8041 12132.1868 -0.2603 
(Firm Size=0) -11818.3370 8748.7420 -29801.6337 6164.9597 -0.2615 
(I_O=0) -4071.7898 11226.4033 -27147.9924 19004.4127 -0.0787 
(Prior Exp=-1) 
 -1793.6966 19754.8905 -42400.4557 38813.0624 -0.0165 
(School Tier=-1) 
 7860.6687 6296.6154 -5082.2096 20803.5469
 0.1968 
(School Tier=0) 
 2635.3303 8997.9331 -15860.1860 21130.8467
 0.0583 
Tenure 972.7071 477.8034 -9.4318 1954.8461
 0.5577 
Note: The T-Value used to calculate these confidence limits was 2.056. 
Analysis of Variance Section 
   Sum of Mean  Prob Power 
Source DF R2 Squares Square F-Ratio Level (5%) 
Intercept 1  4.047407E+09 4.047407E+09 
Model 9 0.4435 5.109996E+09 5.677773E+08 2.3020.0468 0.7902 
Error 26 0.5565 6.411994E+09 2.466152E+08 
Total(Adjusted) 35 1.0000 1.152199E+10 3.291997E+08 
 
Analysis of Variance Detail Section 
Model   Sum of Mean  Prob Power 
Term DF R2 Squares Square F-Ratio Level (5%) 
Intercept 1  4.047407E+09 4.047407E+09 
Model 9 0.4435 5.109996E+09 5.677773E+08 2.3020.0468 0.7902 
Age 1 0.0171 1.965694E+08 1.965694E+08 0.7970.3802 0.1381 
Education Level 
 1 0.0456 5.249764E+08 5.249764E+08 2.1290.1565 0.2900 
Firm Size 2 0.0415 4.780627E+08 2.390314E+08 0.9690.3927 0.1998 
I_O 1 0.0028 3.244212E+07 3.244212E+07 0.1320.7198 0.0641 
Prior Exp 1 0.0002 2033146 2033146 0.0080.9283 0.0509 
School Tier 2 0.0334 3.850918E+08 1.925459E+08 0.7810.4685 0.1684 
Tenure 1 0.0887 1.022081E+09 1.022081E+09 4.1440.0521 0.5002 
Error 26 0.5565 6.411994E+09 2.466152E+08 
Total(Adjusted) 35 1.0000 1.152199E+10 3.291997E+08   
   
Plots Section 
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